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International Law: A Welfarist Approach
Eric A. Posnert
This Article evaluates international law from a welfarist perspective. Global welfarism re-
quires that international law advance the well-being of everyone in the world, and scholars influ-
enced by global welfarism and similar cosmopolitan principles have advocated radical restructur-
ing of international law. But global welfarism is subject to several constraints; including (1) hetero-
geneity of preferences of the world population, which produces the state system; (2) agency costs,
which produce imperfect governments; and (3) the problem of collective action. These constraints
place limits on what policies motivated by global welfarism can achieve and explain some broad
features of international law that otherwise remain puzzling. These features include the central
place of state sovereignty in international law despite the moral arbitrariness of borders; the weak-
ness of multilateral treaties; the limited role of individual liability in international law; the pre-
dominantly legislative nature of international institutions and the weakness of executive and judi-
cial institutions; and the absence of redistributive obligations in international law. These constraints
also suggest that the rapid increase in the number of states over the past half century may be related
to the advance of international law.
I. INTRODUCTION
International law scholarship lacks a well-defined and broadly
accepted normative framework that can be used to evaluate the doc-
trines of international law and to generate proposals for reform.
Scholars debate the merits of particular doctrines either by appealing
to other doctrines or broad principles said to be immanent in interna-
tional law, or by claiming to derive their conclusions from normative
assumptions that are rarely articulated or justified with any precision.
The first approach is circular, the second leaves the debates mired in
uncertainties about first principles. What is needed is a framework
t Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to
Allison Danner, Tom Ginsburg, Robert Goodin, Eugene Kontorovich, Cass Sunstein, Alan Sykes.
Adrian Vermeule, John Yoo; to participants at talks at Vanderbilt, Duke. and Berkeley for com-'
ments; to Ross Tucker for research assistance; and to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation
and the John M. Olin Foundation for financial support.
The University of Chicago Law Review
that is rooted in political morality while being precise enough to allow
sufficiently defined conclusions. This Article argues that a useful
framework would have two elements: welfarism and a realistic under-
standing of institutional constraints. The argument, in brief, is that in-
stitutionally constrained welfarism shows the advantages of the state
system and some other important features of international law and
suggests problems with many proposals for international legal reform
that can be found in the literature.
As an illustration of the problem with current scholarship, consider
the debate about NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Nearly eve-
ryone recognizes that this intervention violated international law. Un-
der the United Nations Charter, cross-border military force may be
used in self-defense' or with the authorization of the UN Security
Council; neither of these conditions was met in Kosovo. At the same
time, the intervention probably saved thousands of lives, and may
even have prevented a genocide. Was it justified? Some commentators
condemned the intervention because it violated international law but
did not address the question whether international law that prohibited
states from preventing a genocide was worth defending.' Others con-
cluded that the war was "illegal but legitimate."' This conclusion con-
cedes that an illegal act can be morally justified, but then the question
is: how should the law be changed so that "legitimate" action is per-
mitted?
Several possibilities have been discussed in the literature. One ar-
gument is that states should have the unilateral right to engage in hu-
manitarian intervention.' Other scholars fear that if such a right ex-
isted, some states would use humanitarian goals as a pretext for ag-
gressive war. To prevent reliance on pretexts, some scholars argue that
only the United Nations Security Council should have the power to
authorize humanitarian intervention.6 But that is the status quo, and
anyway the Security Council is controlled by powerful states that will
not act in the global interest. For this reason, some scholars think that
the United Nations system should be revised so that it will be more
democratic: a democratic United Nations would authorize justified
I UN Charter Art 51.
2 UN Charter Art 42.
3 See, for example, Jonathan I. Chamey, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kos-
ovo, 93 Am J Intl L 834, 840-41 (1999); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of
International Law, 93 Am J Intl L 847,848 (1999).
4 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 4 (Oxford 2000).
5 See Fernando R. Tes6n, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in J.L. Hol-
zgrefe and Robert 0. Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilem-
mas 93,93-94 (Cambridge 2003).
6 See, for example, Chamey, 93 Am J Intl L at 840-41 (cited in note 3).
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humanitarian interventions. But giving each state one vote would not
be consistent with democracy, because some states are huge and oth-
ers are tiny. Therefore, voting must be based on population, and, fur-
ther, authoritarian states must be deprived of voting rights in the
United Nations if they do not allow their citizens to vote for dele-
gates.' But, as other scholars point out, the state system is arbitrary
anyway, and sovereignty should be "decentralized," so that there is a
system of overlapping jurisdiction based on the consent of the gov-
erned.8 Or, a world government is the only really effective way to en-
sure that human rights atrocities can be addressed or prevented. But
a world government is not realistic, nor is UN reform; therefore, the
European states (but not the United States, which cannot be trusted)
should form a pact obligating members to cooperate in humanitarian
interventions when necessary.'°
For all of the philosophical sophistication of the scholars involved,
this debate has a fruitless and ungrounded quality. Why exactly is a
world government off limits, if it indeed is?" And if it is off limits, be-
cause it is unrealistic, then why should UN reform, the European
compact, or the decentralization of sovereignty be considered within
limits? The scholars all agree on the larger end of preventing atroci-
ties. Their proposals differ radically not because of disagreement on
ends, but disagreement about what is institutionally possible. But none
of the authors cited for the views described above provides even a
cursory theory of institutional constraints. So their main source of dis-
agreement is not even discussed."2
7 See Peter Singer, One World 144-48 (Yale 2002).
8 See Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities
and Reforms 190-94 (Polity 2002).
9 See Kai Nielsen, World Government, Security, and Global Justice, in Steven Luper-Foy,
ed, Problems of International Justice 263,276 (Westview 1988).
10 See Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for
International Law 450-54 (Oxford 2004).
11 But see generally Alexander Wendt, Why a World State Is Inevitable, 9 Eur J Intl Rel 491
(2003). Wendt's argument is positive rather than normative, but he makes clear that he believes
that a world government would be desirable (as well as inevitable). See id at 529. Wendt is in a
very small minority, and as he puts off the creation of world government for at least another
century, see id at 492, the possibility has no relevant short-term implications even if he is correct.
12 Philosophical disagreement, to be sure, is genuine. The debate between Michael Walzer
and his critics turns, in part, on a disagreement about whether universal moral principles forbid
governments from abusing their citizens and authorize other governments to intervene to stop
such abuse. Compare Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations 101-02 (Basic 1977) (expressing skepticism over whether governments that send
troops into a foreign state for humanitarian interventions act with pure motives), with David
Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 Phil & Pub Aff 160, 178 (1980) (arguing that if "an inter-
vention is on behalf of socially basic human rights it is justified"). However, on closer inspection
the philosophical disagreement is swamped by what seem like empirical disagreements. Both
Walzer and Luban are willing to allow states to engage in humanitarian interventions on some
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The larger point is that reform of international law is possible and
normative arguments can be brought to bear, but there are, in Jack
Goldsmith's words, "plausibility constraints" that limit the universe of
possible reforms.3 Goldsmith argues that people are essentially self-
interested, or at least not willing to make the sacrifices demanded by
the philosophers; that governments and other institutions, by design,
advance their interests, especially when these institutions are democ-
ratic; and therefore institutional reform that could address global
problems in a cosmopolitan spirit is not possible.4 Still, reform of in-
ternational institutions is possible and has occurred from time to time,
and there must be some reforms that are better than other reforms.
The question is, what constrains reform of international law? What
makes some reform proposals realistic and others unrealistic?
In this Article, I try to answer this question. I argue that for pro-
posals of international legal reform to be institutionally plausible, they
must assume the existence of (1) heterogeneous preferences among
the world population, which give rise to the state system; (2) agency
costs, which give rise to the imperfection of governments; and (3) the
collective action problem. In such a world, international legal reform is
possible but highly limited. For expository convenience, I assume that
international legal reform is justified to the extent that it enhances
global welfare-the well-being of everyone living in the world. I argue
that even if we all have a moral obligation to advance global welfa-
rism, the implications for international law are limited. Some frequently
criticized features of existing international law can be defended on
global welfarist premises, within the constraints created by heterogene-
ity of preferences, agency costs, and collective action problems.
In brief the argument is this. Populations have, over the centuries,
divided themselves up into political groupings that today take the form of
nation-states. The size and scope of nation-states reflect much historical
contingency, but beyond this is a basic tradeoff between the heterogene-
ity of populations and economies of scale." Increasing economies of scale,
driven by technological change, give advantages to people who are mem-
level. See Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 Phil & Pub
Aff 209, 216-18 (1980) (expressing approval of humanitarian intervention when states are mas-
sacring, enslaving, or expelling nationals); Luban, 9 Phil & Pub Aff at 178 (indicating support for
allowing states to engage in humanitarian intervention to protect basic human rights). Walzer
cares about the rights and well-being of foreigners, and Luban concedes the importance of local
culture, history, and the other determinants of political community. So the disagreement seems
mainly about the relative importance of these factors.
13 Jack L. Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 Stan L Rev 1667,
1673 (2003). See also Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 205
(Oxford 2005).
14 See Goldsmith, 55 Stan L Rev at 1667-70 (cited in note 13).
15 See Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations 18-23 (MIT 2003).
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bers of large self-regulating populations, but when people's tastes and
values are too heterogeneous, sovereignty is impossible. Thus, the world
is divided among dozens of independent states. When people divide
themselves into groups such as nation-states, regional and global pub-
lic goods are not created, and instead nation-states have an incentive
to externalize costs on people living outside their borders. The func-
tion of international law is to correct these problems and enable peo-
ple to obtain public goods of regional and global scale. But interna-
tional law can exist only as long as states support it. Standard doctrine
therefore acknowledges that all, or nearly all, states must consent to a
rule before it can be deemed to be a part of international law. Several
things follow from this. Because people have no interest in transfer-
ring significant resources to those living in other countries, interna-
tional law does not require wealthy states to aid the poor; it only re-
quires states (rich and poor) to cooperate. Further, cooperation for
the purpose of creating public goods is limited by agency costs and
collective action problems. Because citizens cannot easily monitor and
sanction governments that act against their interest, governments will
not always agree to international law that benefits their own citizens.
And because there is no world government, international law can exist
as an effective constraint only when states can overcome the collective
action problem. The latter point suggests that narrow international
agreements, involving few states, are likely to be more effective than
large multilateral conventions.
The plan of this Article is as follows. Part II discusses the philoso-
phical literature in more detail and shows how radically different re-
form proposals flow not from philosophical disagreement but from
unstated assumptions about institutional constraints. This discussion
helps motivate the focus, in the rest of the Article, on institutions.
Part III discusses my main assumptions: (1) that international law
should maximize global welfare; (2) that preferences are heterogene-
ous; (3) that agency costs exist and therefore governments are imper-
fect; and (4) that enforcement is limited. The first assumption is likely to
be controversial but it is mainly an analytic convenience, and the argu-
ment does not turn on it in any substantial way. The other three assump-
tions are about institutional constraints on welfare-maximization, and I
discuss the extent to which they are accurate, and how they might be
varied.
Part IV discusses the implications of these assumptions for inter-
national law. I discuss some general features of international law, in-
cluding sovereign equality, state responsibility, the central importance
of sovereignty, and the predominantly legislative nature of the inter-
national legal system (and its lack of adjudicative and executive re-
sources).
2006]
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II. THE LITERATURE: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The literature on international legal reform is vast; for expository
convenience, I will discuss a small subset dealing with the problem of
humanitarian intervention. The government of a small state commits
atrocities against its own citizens, perhaps even genocide. The state
could be Uganda in 1971-79, Cambodia in 1975-78, Serbia in the
1990s, Somalia in 1992-93, Rwanda in 1994, or Sudan today. The gov-
ernment is impervious to diplomatic and economic pressure; indeed,
economic pressure might further harm the victims of the government
without affecting its leaders. Under international law, a foreign gov-
ernment has no right to launch a military invasion in order to stop
atrocities from occurring in another state. What should the govern-
ments of other states do?
One possible answer is that foreign governments should do noth-
ing because they have no right to interfere with the domestic policy of
the state in question. This answer is, today, accepted by virtually no
respectable philosopher or lawyer. All of the disagreement concerns
the extent of the humanitarian catastrophe before intervention is jus-
tified. Michael Walzer thinks there must be mass murder, enslavement,
or expulsion;" others think that intervention may be justified if human
rights are violated on a large scale. These differences reflect philoso-
phical and empirical disagreement that are not of concern here.
Most debate today concerns legal and institutional reform. The
reason is that there are many cases where everyone agrees that hu-
manitarian intervention should occur, and yet it does not occur, or it
does occur but illegally, as in Kosovo.
The most common position among international lawyers appears
to be that the status quo is acceptable." Under the current system,
humanitarian intervention can occur only if authorized by the Security
Council of the United Nations. However, the Security Council has
never authorized a military intervention to stop genocide or other
crimes against humanity. So staying with the status quo implicitly ac-
cepts this state of affairs, presumably on the ground that more permis-
sive rules would permit unjustified military interventions. These unjus-
tified military interventions would, perhaps, be worse than the hu-
16 See Walzer, 9 Phil & Pub Aff at 216-18 (cited in note 12).
17 See, for example, Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules about
Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in Holzgrefe
and Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Intervention 177, 178-79 (cited in note 5). Thomas Franck takes
an intermediate position and finds the status quo in international law acceptable only because
international law is flexible enough to be fair. See Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change
in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in Holzgrefe and Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Interven-
tion 204,226-27 (cited in note 5).
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manitarian interventions forgone because of the strict rules currently
in place.
Philosophers and philosophically inclined lawyers do not approve
of the status quo, however. They have proposed various imaginative
reforms.
Brian Barry argues that military intervention for humanitarian
reasons is sometimes justified but the problem with "the current sta-
tist system is that decisions are taken in an ad hoc way, and this is
equally true whether the action is unilateral or taken under the aus-
pices of the Security Council." 8 To solve this problem and related
problems, what is needed is a world government or, if that is impossi-
ble, "the creation of an international legal system that takes prece-
dence over those of individual states."'9 Barry does not describe this
legal system or explain how it would be possible if a world govern-
ment is not.
Peter Singer argues that states should engage in humanitarian in-
tervention because national sovereignty has no moral weight and res-
cuing individuals from human rights atrocities does. ° However, he
believes that if states were permitted to decide for themselves whether
humanitarian intervention is justified, they would use humanitarian
intervention as a pretext for aggressive war, plunging the world into
chaos.21 Therefore, an independent institution such as the United Na-
tions must have the responsibility for deciding whether humanitarian
intervention is justified, and states must be bound to comply with the
United Nations's judgment. The problem with this suggestion, Singer
continues, is that the United Nations is not a democratic body; indeed,
authoritarian states have veto power. Singer concludes that the United
Nations must be reformed so that it is more democratic. In particular,
he argues that all states should send delegates to the United Nations
in proportion to their population; these delegates should be democ-
ratically elected, and thus should be representatives of people rather
than of states; the United Nations should supervise the elections; and
authoritarian states that refuse to allow such elections should be lim-
ited to one delegate."
18 Brian Barry, Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, in Ian Shapiro and Lea
Brilmayer, eds, NOMOS XLI: Global Justice 12,39 (NYU 1999).
19 Id at 40. See also Jonathan Glover, State Terrorism, in R.G. Frey and Christopher W.
Morris, eds, Violence, Terrorism, and Justice 256, 272 (Cambridge 1991) (arguing that interna-
tional courts should have jurisdiction over complaints brought against states by citizens who
allege human rights violations).
20 See Singer, One World at 148-49 (cited in note 7).
21 See id at 137-39.
22 See id at 144-48.
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Allen Buchanan agrees that states should engage in humanitarian
intervention." However, he has little faith in the United Nations and
does not believe that in the near future it can be reformed. Instead, he
argues that the wealthy liberal democracies (except the United States,
which lacks international legitimacy, in his view) should enter a treaty
that compels them to engage in humanitarian intervention when hu-
man rights violations in a target country exceed a threshold. "Of course
any attempt to construct a coalition of democratic, human-rights re-
specting states for humanitarian intervention would require the richer
European states to do something they have not done in over fifty years:
make a serious investment in military capacity rather than depending
upon the United States."' , Nonetheless, Buchanan's main worry is not
that the Europeans would refuse to form such a coalition but that the
United States would block its formation.
Thomas Pogge does not address humanitarian intervention in any
detail but seems willing to consider it, if it takes place under the aus-
pices of a multilateral body. But he thinks that human rights atrocities
would be a much less significant problem in a world that looked like
the following:
What we need is both centralization and decentralization-a kind
of second-order decentralization away from the now dominant
level of the state. Thus, persons should be citizens of, and govern
themselves through, a number of political units of various sizes,
without any one political unit being dominant and thus occupy-
ing the traditional role of state. And their political allegiance and
loyalties should be widely dispersed over these units: neighbor-
hood, town, county, province, state, region, and world at large.
People should be politically at home in all of them, without con-
verging upon any one of them as the lodestar of their political
identity."
Pogge promises to develop this proposal but never does, instead
admitting that "[n]othing definite can be said about the ideal number
of levels or the exact distribution of legislative, executive, and judicial
23 For a general discussion, see Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (cited
in note 10).
24 Id at 453.
25 See id. See also Allen Buchanan and Robert 0. Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force:A
Cosmopolitan Institutional Perspective, 18 Ethics & Intl Aff 1, 13-22 (2004) (endorsing a more
complicated scheme designed to permit states to engage in preventive war on the condition that
they agree to pay sanctions if the factual predicate of the war turns out to be false, as determined
by an independent body).
26 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights at 178 (cited in note 8).
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functions over them."27 Pogge also argues that various international
institutions should be set up that would have the power to ensure that
only democratic governments would be able to issue sovereign debt.-
Democratic governments would pass constitutional amendments that
prohibit future unconstitutional governments from borrowing; in case
of dispute about whether a future government is unconstitutional, the
matter would be referred to an independent Democracy Panel acting
under the auspices of the UN; and, lest creditors be unwilling to lend to
democracies because they fear that future unconstitutional govern-
ments will renege on debts if they cannot borrow more, an International
Democratic Loan Guarantee Fund would ensure that outstanding debt
is serviced until a democratic government is reestablished.,9
Fernando Tes6n takes the simplest view; he argues that interna-
tional law should permit unilateral humanitarian intervention."° If such
a norm existed, then states would be more willing to intervene in or-
der to stop atrocities in other states. Tes6n does not believe that the
pretext problem is severe. All of international law is vulnerable to pre-
text and yet it functions adequately because states that violate inter-
national law under a pretext risk being deemed lawbreakers by other
states.
Why do Barry, Singer, Buchanan, Pogge, and Tes6n come to such
different conclusions, even though their normative premises are simi-
lar? All of them reject the old-fashioned view that the borders of a
state are sacrosanct; all agree that human rights violations in one
country ought to concern people living in others; and all of them ac-
knowledge that the use of military force in order to stop atrocities
may be justified.
The divergence in their positions is due to unstated institutional
assumptions. Buchanan and (probably) Tes6n do not believe that the
United Nations can be reformed so as to be more democratic or more
likely to authorize humanitarian interventions. Buchanan thinks, how-
ever, that the Europeans would take up the slack. Barry thinks that a
world government is possible or, if not, an international legal system
that takes precedence over national laws (unlike the current system).
Singer does not think that a world government is possible but does
27 Idat 189.
28 See id at 153-55.
29 See id at 153-60.
30 See Tes6n, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention at 93-94 (cited in note 5).
See also Eric A. Posner and Alan 0. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, 93 Georgetown L J
993, 1014-16 (2005) (leaving open the possibility of humanitarian intervention under interna-
tional law); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U Chi L Rev 729,793-94 (2004) (outlining factors relevant
to whether the international legal system will ultimately accept humanitarian intervention).
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think that radical reform of the UN is. Pogge thinks that a world gov-
ernment would be inferior to his regime of overlapping jurisdictions."
There are good reasons for doubting the more institutionally am-
bitious claims. A world government is not a realistic possibility, and
Barry does not explain how an international legal system would be
possible without a world government to create and enforce it.32 Singer's
proposal requires amendment of the UN Charter," but amendment
requires a supermajority in the General Assembly and any amend-
ment to the charter can be vetoed by the permanent members of the
Security Council.' Singer assumes that states like China (which has
veto power), Nigeria, and Iran would acquiesce in a system under
which they must either give their citizens a vote (which they would
not do) or else enjoy voting power equivalent to, or less than, that of
Nauru (population approximately 13,000) or Iceland (population ap-
proximately 297,000). In Singer's system, if India, a democracy, permit-
ted its citizens to vote for UN delegates, it would have the voting
power of more than one hundred other countries; yet most of these
countries would also have to acquiesce in Singer's reform proposal
even though they know that their voting power would be swamped by
that of a single state." Buchanan imagines that the Europeans would
31 For other proposals, see Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy 265-75 (Oxford
2000) (proposing "a global system of regulatory regimes to which locales and regions relate in a
federated system"); Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, eds, Re-imagining Politi-
cal Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy 113-228 (Stanford 1998) (introducing vari-
ous proposals for international reform); David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the
Modem State to Cosmopolitan Governance 267-86 (Stanford 1995) (advocating stronger interna-
tional institutions in the short term and global democracy in the long term).
32 Consider Barry, Statism and Nationalism at 40 (cited in note 18) (describing the exis-
tence of certain perceived "institutional constraints" that limit the scope of reform options
evaluated by cosmopolitans). Yet Barry does not bother to explain what they are, or how they
influence his argument.
33 See Singer, One World at 144-48 (cited in note 7).
34 See UN Charter Art 109.
35 Singer's is merely a more elaborate version of a recurrent theme in philosophical work
on international justice, namely, that one needs to "strengthen the United Nations," with little or
no attention to the question whether states will consent to a strengthened United Nations. See,
for example, Young, Inclusion and Democracy at 265-75 (cited in note 31) (arguing that "institu-
tions of the United Nations are the best existing starting-points for building global democratic
institutions"). The evidence suggests that states will not consent to a strengthened United Na-
tions. Although everyone recognizes that the current organization-which places virtually all
decisionmaking power in the hands of the five vetoholders in the Security Council-is both
undemocratic and nearly ineffective, no seriously considered reform proposal would improve
matters. For example, the Secretary-General's recent proposal would increase the number of
Security Council members from fifteen to twenty-four by creating new permanent or temporary
memberships that lack veto power. See United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secre-
tary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All 43
(Mar 21,2005), UN Doc A/59/2005. Although the formal membership would be more represen-
tative of the regions of the world, decisionmaking would become more, rather than less, difficult,
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take on the burden of humanitarian intervention, even though no
European country has shown the slightest interest in humanitarian
intervention in the past (with the ambiguous exception of the Kosovo
intervention, which was largely the work of the United States), nor
any inclination, as he notes, to shoulder the cost of an effective mili-
tary.6 He also imagines that, American obstructionism aside, states
like China and Russia would not have any objection to the European
force, even though both countries, which routinely violate the human
rights of internal minorities, have made their skepticism about hu-
manitarian intervention clear in the recent past. Pogge cavalierly dis-
misses the concern that must be on every reader's mind-that his pro-
posal is a recipe for chaos-by observing that in modern federalist
states like the United States, the location of ultimate authority is often
confusing and vague." But the identification of ultimate authority does
matter-it matters, for example, whether the Arkansas National
Guard obeys President Eisenhower or Orval Faubus, just as it matters
whether Yugoslav army units obey President Milogevid of Serbia or
President Tudjman of Croatia. The reason that such conflicts do not
happen more often in countries like the United States is that lines of
authority, while not always clearly described in constitutional docu-
ments, are well understood and enjoy consensus.
In addition to explaining the disagreements among these theo-
rists, lack of attention to institutional problems also leads to internal
inconsistencies in their proposals. In a discussion of secession, Barry
says:
If the breakup of an existing state would make the maintenance
of liberal institutions easier (or at least no less likely) and is de-
sired by those in the area (without any division about its desir-
because the five vetoholders would continue to be able to block decisions and a larger number
of states would be needed to approve them. This proposal has virtually no support, anyway.
The most discussed alternative, advanced by Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, proposes
adding ten members to the Security Council, of which these four nations and two others would
have permanent seats and vetoes See William M. Reilly, Analysis: U.N. Security Council Reform,
UPI (Nov 12, 2005), online at http://www.upi.com/lnternationallntelligenceview.php?StorylD=
20051111-050145-6910r (visited Mar 26,2006). This proposal would also increase the representa-
tiveness of the Security Council by reducing its effectiveness: with six extra vetoholders and a
larger body, agreement would be more difficult than it is today.
If these or similar reform proposals are accepted, then the likelihood that future humanitar-
ian interventions will receive UN approval will be even lower than what it is today. This suggests
that the only serious alternative to an effective prohibition on humanitarian intervention is the
unilateral right advocated by Tes6n, as I discuss below.
36 See Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination at 453 (cited in note 10).
Buchanan also ignores the extremely important political and logistical problems of managing an
international military force, problems that would, in the foreseeable future, render a European
military coalition far weaker than the sum of its parts.
37 See Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights at 178 (cited in note 8).
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ability between different groups within it), there is no reason for
a cosmopolitan to oppose it."
Note the tension between this claim and his argument in favor of
a world government or international legal system that takes prece-
dence over national law. A world government is needed to solve global
problems like climate warming. However, a world government might
mistreat regions or sections; so these regions or sections must have the
right to secede. Yet then they might secede so as to avoid the world
government's climate laws, and we are back to our interstate system
that cannot solve the global warming problem. It is hard to see how
one could both support a world government and an expansive right to
secede. There might be some way to resolve this tension, but Barrydoes not tell us what it is. Pogge similarly approves of international
rules that would encourage separatist movements that would break up
states" while assuming that the resulting centrifugal forces would not
affect the large liberal democracies on which he depends to enforce
other elements of his ambitious program. '
Only Tes6n's argument seems plausible. Although most countries
support the status quo, some states, such as Britain and possibly the
United States, support a rule permitting humanitarian intervention.'
Such a rule was endorsed in a recent UN report on reform of the UN,
although that report envisioned a continuing requirement of Security
Council authorization.2 In addition, Tes6n can point to precedents-
that is, unilateral or coalition-led humanitarian interventions that did
not meet substantial world opposition, including interventions in Cam-
bodia by Vietnam, Uganda by Tanzania, and Kosovo by NATO-that
bolster his claim that a rule permitting humanitarian intervention is
sustainable within the framework of international law. 3 The upshot is
that although the status quo may prevail, a moderate revision of the
law is possible.
What makes Tes6n's argument seem more realistic than the oth-
ers? In part, the answer is that Tes6n's argument depends on a well
understood mechanism of international legal reform -the development
38 Barry, Statism and Nationalism at 56 (cited in note 18).
39 See Pogge, World Poverty at 190-91 (cited in note 8).
40 See id at 208. Pogge makes his assumption despite the fact that we can observe separa-
tist forces at work already in countries like Britain, Spain, and Italy.
41 See, for example, Press Association, Straw: War Won't Change UN Charter, Guardian
Unlimited (Mar 30, 2004), online at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956.1182177,
00.html (visited Mar 26,2006).
42 See Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom at 33 (cited in note 35).
43 See Tes6n, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention at 113 (cited in note 5).Consider Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention at 214-31(cited in note 17) (cataloging various interventions and crises).
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of customary international law-and it draws on empirical evidence
about the attitudes and practices of states. But even Tes6n's position is
partial and unsatisfactory. What is needed is a more general framework
for evaluating the realism of proposals for international legal reform,
where "realism" refers to their consistency with what we know about
human psychology and the problems of institutional design.
III. ASSUMPTIONS
There has long been the view that international law should ad-
vance global justice, not merely serve the interests of states, but this
view is in tension with the traditional basis of international law -the
consent of states. Nonetheless, improvement of international law
through reform is surely possible. The question is how to distinguish
reform proposals that are possible from those that are not. To do this,
one needs a theory that explains the institutional constraints on inter-
national lawmaking.
In this Part, I discuss my assumptions. I make one normative and
three positive assumptions. The normative assumption is that the goal
of international legal reform should be to maximize global welfare.
The positive assumptions are that (1) the preferences of the world
population are heterogeneous; (2) governments try to maximize the
welfare of their citizens or a subpopulation of their citizens (elites,
government supporters), and ignore the welfare of noncitizens; and
(3) international legal organization and enforcement are constrained
by the collective action problem."
44 These three assumptions will not surprise consumers of the trade literature, which is
preoccupied both by agency costs (which are often assumed to explain government preferences
for certain groups like import-competers) and collective action problems. See generally Alan 0.
Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working
Paper No 216,2004), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=56 4 38
3 (visited Mar 26,2006). Preference
heterogeneity is also an important factor in the large literature on federalism and the optimal
size of jurisdictions. See, for example, Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 103-25
(Princeton 2000) (discussing intergovernmental relations and the optimal number of govern-
ments). The three assumptions also play an important role in the literature on international
environmental law. See generally, for example, Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Art
of Environmental Treaty-Making (Oxford 2003); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental
Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L J 677 (1999); Richard L. Revesz,
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the International
Community, 83 Va L Rev 1331 (1997) (discussing the impact that multijurisdictional problems
and collective action problems have on environmental regulation); Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-
Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Develop-
ment, 91 Am J Intl L 231 (1997) (explaining in interest terms the uneven pace of cross-national
convergence of laws and regulations around the globe). However, the three assumptions central
to this work rarely play an important role in the literature on public international law generally.
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A. Welfarism
Welfarism is the theory that an action is good if it maximizes the
welfare of relevant individuals; global welfarism is the theory that all
individuals, rather than the members of a particular group or society,
are counted in the social welfare function. Thus, in a global welfarist
regime, the welfare of all individuals counts equally.
Welfarism is a version of consequentialism-the idea that the
goodness of actions depends on their consequences rather than their
intrinsic nature. By contrast, deontologists believe that individuals have
certain duties that are not exhausted by their consequences; for exam-
ple, one must tell the truth in cases where truth telling reduces welfare
rather than increases it.
There are many different theories of welfare. Economists gener-
ally assume that a person's welfare is a function of preference satisfac-
tion. The best way to enhance a person's welfare is by giving her what
she prefers-or, better yet, money, which she can use to buy what she
wants. Philosophers reject this view and offer various alternatives.
Some philosophers agree that a person's welfare increases when his
preferences or desires are satisfied but further stipulate that only cer-
tain preferences or desires (informed, nondistorted, etc.) count. Oth-
ers argue that welfare is a function of mental states: a person's welfare
increases when he has the mental state that corresponds to happiness
or other positive feeling. Still others argue that welfare increases when
a person acquires certain objective goods-health, friendship, educa-
tion-regardless of whether he or she wants these goods or these
goods provide him or her with a positive mental state." I do not ex-press a view about which of these versions of welfarism is correct; my
argument is compatible with all of them, within reasonable limits.
Why should international law reform be based on global welfa-
rism? The main reason is that nearly everyone agrees that the welfare
of human beings is, at least, a relevant consideration for governments.
Authoritarian governments, theological governments, and liberal gov-
ernments all agree that they should be concerned about improving the
well-being of their citizens, even if they agree on little else. Because
international law is based on the consent of states, it can reflect only
their areas of agreement, and not their areas of disagreement. Thus,
welfarist premises are an attractive starting point for understanding
and evaluating international law.4'
45 See generally James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Impor-
tance (Oxford 1986).
46 welfarism is also the standard assumption in the vast international trade literature. See,
for example, Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System 3,
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There are two plausible alternatives to the welfarist approach.
The first alternative view is that the purpose of international law is to
advance the interests of states, not the people who live in them. After
all, international law is based on the consent of states, and states will
not consent to international law reform that does not advance their
interests. This view is an old one and implicit in much traditional
scholarship,47 but it confuses normative and positive. States themselves
are not moral agents; state interests are just constructs based on the
interests and values of people living within states. Modern moral theo-
rists agree that the relevant moral agents are people--not nations or
other collectivities. To make an argument based on political morality,
one must appeal to the values and interests of people, not collectiv-
ities.4
The second alternative view is that international law should ad-
vance human rights or democratic institutions. This view is consistent
with the consensus assumption that individuals, not groups, matter, but
it rejects welfarism in favor of a social contract or rights-based per-
spective. 9 Although I have doubts about this position, my purpose is
not to criticize it. As I noted above, most contractarians such as Rawls
13 (MIT 2002) (assuming a national trade policy based on the objective of maximizing national
welfare). For that reason, welfarism is also an attractive assumption for evaluating public inter-
national law more generally.
47 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 307 (Co-
lumbia 2d ed 1995); Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 337-39 (Co-
lumbia 2d ed 1979).
48 See, for example, Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 71-83
(Princeton 1979). This is the overwhelming consensus in moral theory; even authors who take
seriously nationalism and the nation-state base their views on the importance of collectivities for
the well-being or dignity of individuals. See, for example, John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 27-30
(Harvard 1999) (noting that collectivities of "liberal peoples" have the right to protect them-
selves because their societies are based on promoting justice for all their citizens and all peo-
ples); David Miller, On Nationality 51-52 (Oxford 1995) (arguing, in part, that the nation-state
can be defended on an ethical basis because the presence of nation-states facilitates the transfer
of necessary resources to ensure the dignity of individuals); Walzer, 9 Phil & Pub Aff at 209-16
(cited in note 12) (clarifying that his theories, which have been characterized as "statist," are
developed not for the state but instead for the "political community that (usually) underlies it").
See also Barry, Statism and Nationalism at 15-34 (cited in note 18) (providing a survey and cri-
tique of nationalist theories, such as Miller's); Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New
Normative Approaches 23-81 (Columbia 1992) (providing a slightly dated discussion of the
literature on "communitarian" versus "cosmopolitan" approaches to international relations).
49 Pogge and Buchanan adopt the rights-based perspective. See Pogge, World Poverty and
Human Rights at ch 2 (cited in note 8); Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination at
ch 3 (cited in note 10). This view has its origin with Kant. See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace
and Other Essays on Politics; History, and Morals 33 (Hackett 1983) (Ted Humphrey, trans).
Singer, by contrast, is a welfarist, although in One World he makes nonwelfarist "fairness" or
casuistic arguments as well as welfarist arguments. See Singer, One World at 43-49, 185-95 (cited
in note 7). Another welfarist is Robert Goodin. See Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public
Philosophy ch 16 (Cambridge 1995) (discussing responsibilities toward fellow citizens versus
foreigners).
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agree that governments should concern themselves with the public's
welfare. The argument in this Article focuses on institutional con-
straints on international law reform, and it will generally not matter,
for purposes of the argument, whether the constraints limit reform for
welfarist purposes or reform for the sake of vindicating human rights.
In many cases, one might, without affecting the argument, replace
"welfare" with "welfare subject to human rights constraints," as the
maximand. So although I will assume that welfarism is the right crite-
rion for evaluating reform, the assumption is mainly for expository
convenience, and the argument would, in large part, remain unaltered
if I focused on human rights instead.'
B. Heterogeneous Preferences and the State System
A state is a political entity that joins a territory and a population.
People in the territory are in the state, and subject to its jurisdiction.
The state acts through a government, which may change over time,
even as the state itself remains constant. The government typically has
a monopoly on force within the territory of the state.
Because the government of a state has a monopoly on force, it
can provide public goods to its citizens. It finances the public goods by
taxing citizens, and it prevents foreigners from free riding by control-
ling its borders. The standard list of public goods includes security,
environmental quality, provision of market institutions, education, and
social insurance. The larger the state, the more cheaply it can provide
public goods, as it can spread the cost over a larger population.
Why, then, is there not a single world state? A world state would
be able to spread the fixed costs of public goods over the largest pos-
sible population, and thus supply them more cheaply than any smaller
state. There is no reason in principle why a world state cannot exist,
but history suggests that the problem is that as the territory controlled
by a government increases in size, the government experiences in-
creasing difficulty providing public goods to the increasingly diverse
people within the territory. People in remote areas realize that they
can improve their well-being by separating from the existing state and
either starting a new state or joining a neighbor. The government is
not wealthy enough to bribe them to stay, or powerful enough to pre-
vent them from leaving. Thus, the fundamental reason for the exis-
tence of multiple states is the heterogeneity of preferences (defined
broadly to include interests, values, and so forth).
50 Yet another normative assumption is that the purpose of international law is to maintain
peace. The problem with this view is that peace is not necessarily desirable if the status quo is
unjust and those with power are unwilling to yield it peacefully.
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The world is divided among a large number of states. The gov-
ernments of the states recognize, for the most part, the existence of all
the other states. This means that each government has absolute or
near-absolute power to govern people within its territory, and also that
each government acknowledges that it has no power to govern people
within the territory of other states. This is generally what is meant by
"sovereignty."'" There are some limits on sovereignty. Most important,
in principle all UN members except vetoholders could find themselves
legally obliged to obey a Security Council resolution that restricts their
control of their territory, but this restriction is more formal than real
because the vetoholders rarely agree and most nonvetoholders can claim
one of the vetoholders as a patron." European nations have yielded some
sovereignty to the European Union, but this sharing of sovereignty pro-
vides no other states with authority over the European nations. And
although all states are subject to treaty obligations, the populations of
those states retain the formal and real power to direct their govern-
ments to violate the treaties, and so in this respect treaty obligations
are consistent with the existence of sovereignty. Sovereignty is based
on the beliefs and attitudes of populations, and cannot be lost or given
away unless the relevant population acquiesces.
A few more assumptions should be mentioned. First, preferences
cluster in a territorial fashion: people who live in France are more
similar to each other than they are to people who live in Germany or
Indonesia. Second, the clustering of preferences cannot be easily
changed by policy. Although states try to instill uniformity through
education, propaganda, and so forth, there are limits to what they can
do. Third, it is not practicable to have different governments providing
different public goods at different levels unless there is a single hierar-
chical authority that can resolve disputes."
A state exists only as long as its government can maintain control
of people within its territory and prevent other states from encroach-
51 There is an enormous literature on this topic. See, for example, John H. Jackson, Sover-
eignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 Am J Intl L 782, 783 (2003) (de-
scribing the "monopoly of power" as the "core of sovereignty"); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty:
Organized Hypocrisy 8 (Princeton 1999) (arguing that while almost all states have enjoyed in-
ternational recognition, many fewer states have held "Westphalian sovereignty"). The word is
used in many ways, often inconsistently; however, the core meaning I identify is uncontroversial.
52 See Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after
Kosovo 151-52 (Palgrave 2001).
53 The reason for this is that there are great economies of scope in government. See
Alesina and Spolaore, The Size of Nations at 27 (cited in note 15). If this assumption is aban-
doned, then conceivably various overlapping jurisdictions would be possible. See generally
Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: Functional,
Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (Elgar 2004) (proposing a scheme of voluntary, over-
lapping jurisdictions).
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ing. A state ceases to exist when it is annexed by another state; this can
happen simply because the original state's population prefers to be a
part of the larger state. States can also divide as a result of secessionist
movements, and new states come into existence when separatists es-
tablish control over a territory, exclude the government of the original
state, and manage to obtain the recognition of other states.
C. Agency Costs and Governments
1. Perfect government.
Governments determine how the state's power is used to regulate
people. It is useful to consider first an "ideal" government that, I will
assume, is a perfect agent for the citizens of the state. Such a govern-
ment chooses policies that maximize the welfare of its own citizens
but ignores the welfare of citizens of other states. Typically, this means
that the government creates public goods -including defense, internal
security against crime, environmental protection, enforcement of
property and contract rights, and so forth-and redistributes wealth.
These sorts of policies benefit the government's citizens, but this
framework does not exclude the possibility that the citizens of one
state care about the well-being of citizens of another state. If this is the
case, the perfect government of the first state will choose policies that
benefit the citizens of the other state. But in any event the government
does not choose policies that are globally welfare-maximizing. 4
This point is worth emphasizing, as many of my conclusions will
follow from it. To see its importance, imagine a hypothetical perfect
world government that does choose policies that maximize global wel-
fare. Such a government would transfer wealth from rich people living
in North America, Australia, Japan, and Europe to poor people living in
Africa, South Asia, and South America. It would also adopt policies that
create global public goods such as control of the world climate -even if
the optimal policies have asymmetric distributive impacts-for exam-
ple, reducing the welfare of people in some richer areas a little, while
increasing the welfare of people in other poorer areas a lot.
Now imagine that the world consists of n states whose govern-
ments maximize domestic welfare. It is clear that the governments of
wealthy states will not consent to welfare-maximizing redistribution of
wealth to poor states, though they may agree to provide moderate aid
in order to satisfy any altruistic impulses of their citizens. It is also
clear that the governments will agree to climate change policies only if
54 See generally Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J Pub Econ 469 (1995)(arguing that welfare-maximizing donations do not necessarily satisfy the Pareto criterion).
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they enhance the welfare of all states. Thus, the state system creates an
implicit Pareto criterion: world policies, reflected in international law,
will exist only when they make all states better-off. The policies that
satisfy the Pareto criterion will be a subset of the policies that are wel-
fare-maximizing because all welfare-maximizing policies with strong
distributive impacts (that is, they make the population in at least one
state worse-off) will be excluded. Thus, international law will supply
fewer public goods than would a hypothetical ideal world government.
2. Imperfect government.
Compounding this problem, all governments are imperfect to
varying degrees. The officials and bureaucrats who operate govern-
ments may choose to maximize the welfare of themselves, their friends
and relatives, their tribes or ethnic groups, the inhabitants of certain
regions, and other groups that are a subset of the entire population. At
one extreme, a dictator may take account of only his own welfare or
that of his family. At the other extreme, a well-functioning democracy
will take account of the general population of voters, or the majority,
or various groups or interest groups. The difference is one of degree,
though often very great.
For simplicity, we will imagine two types of states: dictatorships
and democracies. Dictatorships maximize the welfare of a few indi-
viduals or a small group, albeit subject to a constraint -if they provide
too few resources to (or extract too much from) the general popula-
tion, it will revolt." The government of a democracy, we suppose, maxi-
mizes the welfare of the median voter. I will assume, roughly, that the
world at all times consists of a mix of dictatorships and democracies.6
Note that maximization of the welfare of the median voter is not
the same as domestic welfare-maximization: it is consistent, for exam-
ple, with transferring wealth from a poor minority to a wealthy major-
ity, which would not generally enhance welfare because of the dimin-
ishing marginal utility of the dollar.
D. The Collective Action Problem and Enforcement
Because no world government exists that could enforce interna-
tional law, international law can be sustained only if states enforce it in
a decentralized fashion. But decentralized enforcement is highly prob-
lematic and can be effective in only limited circumstances."
55 See Alesina and Spolaore, The Size of Nations at 70 (cited in note 15).
56 This is roughly accurate, and has been throughout the past one hundred years.
57 See Todd Sandier, Global Collective Action 87-90 (Cambridge 2004).
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To see why, imagine that state X violates international law by
sending military forces across its border into state Y. Suppose that
state Y is too weak to resist the military incursion; what is its re-
course? It cannot file a complaint with an international prosecutor, or
bring a lawsuit in an international court (or if it can do the latter, it has
no way to enforce the court's judgment). It can complain to other
states that state X violates international law, but it has no way to com-
pel these other states to take action.
In an ideal world, other states-the international community-
would sanction state X. Sanctions could include cutting off trade, sus-
pending international cooperation, and even military intervention.
Unfortunately, the international community has weak incentives to
impose sanctions on state X. The problem is that sanctioning is costly
for the other states of the world. If a state Z cuts off trade with state
X, then Z suffers from the lack of trade just as X does. If state Z par-
ticipates in an invasion, then Z's soldiers are at risk. Further, Z might
have close and valuable relations with X while having no relationship
with state Y; in such a case, Z would gain very little from cooperating
in imposing sanctions while losing a great deal. Finally, Z might ra-
tionally do nothing in the hope that other states will act: this free rider
problem will undermine the incentives of all states even if they have
an interest in maintaining international borders in general or Y's bor-
ders in particular. For all these reasons, the effective use of sanctions
has been rare.5 8
International law is sustained chiefly through self-help, not collec-
tive action. Victims of illegal behavior retaliate against the violator; to
avoid such retaliation, states comply with international law as much as
they can. For example, when the United States violates WTO rules in
a way that injures the European Union, only the EU retaliates -Japan
does not." When states invade each other, the victim fights back, occa-
sionally with a few allies. Except in rare cases, the rest of the world
does not intervene. When states harass foreign citizens, the victims'
58 See David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strate-
gies in the 1990s 204 (Rienner 2000) (finding a 27-to-36 percent success rate for UN sanctions);
Richard N. Haass, ed, Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy 197 (Council on Foreign
Relations 1998) (finding that sanctions have limited value where goals are overbroad and time is
limited); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered: History and Current Policy 92 (Intl Instit for Econ 2d ed 1990) (finding that sanc-
tions "are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the target
country to take actions it stoutly resists"). All of these sources attribute failure, in part, to collec-
tive action problems.
59 See Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law at 153 (cited in note 13)
(describing the international trade system as a large number of bilateral relationships where
"each state pays attention to the behavior of a trading partner and complains and threatens
retaliation if the partner violates its commitments").
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state threatens retaliation-the rest of the world does not. - Enforce-
ment of international law is in this way mainly a bilateral phenome-
non- a matter between violators and victims--and not a multilateral
phenomenon.
These enforcement problems have two implications for interna-
tional law. First, most of international law reflects the bilateral nature
of enforcement. For example, even though the trade regime is a multi-
lateral system, in the sense that the rules apply to all members, the
regime provides that only the victim of trade violations has a right to
retaliate, even though the system as a whole would be more effective
if all states could agree to retaliate against violators and follow
through on this agreement.6' But states do not make such an agree-
ment because they understand that the free rider problem would un-
dermine it.
Second, international law that, explicitly or implicitly, depends on
(large-number) multilateral enforcement is usually ineffective. Human
rights treaties cannot be enforced through self-help because human
rights abuses of state X against its own citizens do not injure any par-
ticular other state, but the international community at large, to the
extent that the international community cares about human rights.
With no particular victim to threaten retaliation, most states ignore
the human rights regime.
The strength of international law enforcement is an empirical
question, and a great deal of controversy surrounds this question.
Most international law professors believe that enforcement of interna-
tional law is strong because states do not want to be seen as scoff-
laws. The empirical literature provides little support for this view. The
60 For example, Brazil protested the mistaken killing of its national by British police after
terrorist attacks in London. See Elaine Sciolino, Regrets, but No Apology, in London Subway
Shooting, NY Times A12 (July 25, 2005) (stating that Brazil demanded an "explanation" of the
shooting). Mexico protested the U.S. death sentence of its national who had not been advised of
his rights under an international treaty. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Hear Case of
Mexican on Death Row, NY Times A5 (Dec 11,2004). The United States protested the seizure of
Americans as hostages in Iran in 1979. See David Farber, Taken Hostage: The Iran Crisis and
America's First Encounter with Radical Islam 144-47 (Princeton 2005) (describing the American
response to the hostage crisis and the international reaction). In all cases, the rest of the world
was indifferent or mostly passive.
61 See Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law at ch 5 (cited in note 13).
62 See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
Yale L J 2599, 2603 (1997) (arguing that the "process of interaction, interpretation, and internali-
zation of international norms into domestic legal systems is pivotal to understanding why nations
'obey' international law"); Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave at 47 (cited in note 47) (arguing
that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all of the time" out of fear of "roil[ing] relations") (emphasis omitted). But
see Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 Fla St U L Rev 797,800-02
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UN Charter's ban on the use of military force is frequently violated;63
international humanitarian law is selectively invoked;64 and human
61rights treaties are generally ignored. These are all multilateral trea-
ties; by contrast, bilateral treaties seem to have a better record.6 How-
ever, I will avoid taking a strong position on this issue in this Article,
and will vary my assumptions -sometimes assuming that enforcement
is strong and sometimes assuming that enforcement is limited.67
E. Summary
The world population will not subject itself to a single govern-
ment because preferences are heterogeneous. Instead, multiple states
will continue to exist. Because of agency costs, all of these states have
imperfect governments and many of them have extremely bad gov-
ernments. Nonetheless, governments recognize that they can improve
the well-being of their citizens (or a subset of their citizens such as the
(2005) (critiquing Koh's failure to explain why domestic entities expend resources to force states
to comply with international law).
63 See Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power at 2 (cited in note 52).
64 See, for example, Eric A. Posner, Terrorism and the Laws of War, 5 Chi J Intl L 423,428-
29 (2005) (noting that regulations concerning the use of poison gas were largely followed after
World War I but regulations governing the use of submarines were not); Lindsay Moir, The Law
of Internal Armed Conflict 67-88, 119-32 (Cambridge 2002) (discussing the practical effects of
Common Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions); James D. Morrow, The Institu-
tional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, 55 Intl Org 971, 976-77 (2001) (explaining that
the treatment of POWs during World War II varied significantly by theater).
65 See Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Hu-
man Rights? 26 (unpublished manuscript 2005), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=607681 (vis-
ited Mar 26, 2006) (discussing the ratification of human rights treaties as not associated with
human rights improvements in autocratic regimes); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Trea-
ties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L J 1935, 1980-81 (2002) (concluding that the ratification of
human rights treaties is not correlated with improvements in human rights). See also Barrett,
Environment and Statecraft at ch 10 (cited in note 44) (describing difficulties in obtaining com-
pliance with environmental treaties).
66 Trying to establish that bilateral treaties are more effectively enforced than multilateral
treaties would be difficult to do and would require a sophisticated empirical analysis that took
account of selection effects and controlled for the strength of the obligation in the treaty. Thus,
the claim in the text should be considered conjectural. See generally Goldsmith and Posner, The
Limits of International Law at ch 5 (cited in note 13).
67 One puzzle is why the collective action problem hinders interstate cooperation but not
the cooperation within a state's population that is necessary to support regular government. On
the one hand, the population within a state is less diverse, but on the other hand it is far more
numerous than the number of states. Whatever the answer to this puzzle-and no doubt the
collective action problem is always a matter of degree-it does not matter for my analysis be-
cause interstate cooperation assumes intrastate cooperation. That is, if a state's policies are weak
or inconsistent because the internal collective action problem is not overcome, the global effort
to adopt policies that aggregate this state's interest with that of other states will be limited by the
weakness of the state's interest. For example, a treaty that adequately reduces global warming is
not possible-even if the interstate collective action problem is fully resolved-if one or more
state parties to the treaty are unable to aggregate and represent their own citizens' interests in
climate control.
International Law: A Welfarist Approach
elite) by cooperating with other governments. This joint recognition
provides the mechanism that furthers welfare-maximization, much as
in standard analyses of domestic markets and international trade.
States have an interest in supporting international law that allows
them to increase the well-being of their citizens. But the collective
action problem ensures that the amount of cooperation falls short of
the ideal, which is the amount that would exist if the world were gov-
erned by an ideal world state.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This Part draws out the implications from the assumptions de-
scribed in Part II. For expository convenience, I will analyze each of a
series of international legal topics in the following way. First, I assume
that governments are perfect and enforcement is perfect. Second, I
assume that governments are imperfect and enforcement is perfect.
Third, I assume that governments are imperfect and enforcement is
imperfect. Finally, I briefly examine the law, history, and other relevant
evidence. The moral of the story in each case is that even when institu-
tions are strong (governments are perfect, enforcement is perfect), the
structure of the state system places significant limits on the usefulness
of international law. When more realistic assumptions are made about
institutions, then the value of international law is even more limited.
A. State Size, Secession, and Merger
The state system does not have particular implications about the
number or size of states. Indeed, the number and size of states have
changed greatly over the years. Roughly 80 states existed in 1870; 60 in
1900; 80 in 1950; 170 in 1980; and 190 today.6 In this Part, I examine
the implications of my assumptions for state size and number and the
law of secession and recognition.
1. Perfect governments; perfect enforcement.
An important implication of the assumption that governments
are perfect agents-and not an additional assumption that is separate
from it -is that states have the optimal size and shape. As this point is
important, and has rarely attracted any comment in the philosophy or
international law literatures, I will spend some time explaining what I
mean.
68 Alesina and Spolaore, The Size of Nations at 193 (cited in note 15) (graphing the num-
ber of states over time).
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Suppose there are two bordering, self-governing territories, X and
Y.6 Each territory is identical in size, resources, and population, includ-
ing the number of people and the distribution of their preferences.
Each government supplies a single public good-for concreteness, let
us call it "criminal justice."
Each individual's utility is a function of income (from ordinary
market activity) and the public good, minus a tax payment. People's
preferences for the public good are heterogeneous, meaning that some
people value it a lot and some people value it very little. The tax is the
same for everyone, and is used to fund the public good. Thus, people
who attach a high value to the public good are net winners, and people
who attach a low value to the public good are net losers.
Public goods are characterized by high fixed costs. To understand
what this means, suppose that it costs one of the governments $100 to
set up the criminal justice system (build the police stations and court-
houses, etc.), and then another $1 per member of the population (the
more people there are, the more police are needed). If the population
is fifty, then the total cost is $150, and each person must pay a tax of
$3. If the population is one hundred, then the total cost is $200, and
each person must pay a tax of $2. If the population is one thousand,
then the total cost is $1,100, and each person must pay $1.10. Econo-
mists refer to this characteristic as "economies of scale": supplying a
public good is cheaper per person the larger the population.
If criminal justice is a public good, and all else is equal, then the
states X and Y can achieve economies of scale by merging, and thus
combining their criminal justice systems. If each state has a population
of fifty, then-as the numerical example above shows-each citizen
saves $1 when the states are merged. Economies of scale, then, are a
reason why states should merge and become larger. If economies of
scale were all that mattered, then a single world state would be optimal.
However-as noted above-people have heterogeneous prefer-
ences. Suppose some people don't want or need criminal justice pro-
tection, or don't value it much, because they live in remote areas and
don't fear criminal predation. Other people do value criminal justice
because they live in congested cities where crime would be rampant if
not deterred by the police. To simplify, suppose that the first type of
person values the criminal justice system at $1.50 and the second type
of person values it at $5. Further, suppose that initially the low-
valuation type of person lives in state X, and the high-valuation type
of person lives in state Y.
69 See id at 17-30 (providing the basis for the following analysis).
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If the states do not merge, then clearly state X will supply a lower
level of criminal justice than state Y will. Indeed, in our stylized ex-
ample, the state will supply zero criminal justice because the costs ($3
per person) exceed the benefits ($1.50 per person). (More realistically,
state X will invest in fewer courthouses and police stations, and gener-
ate less criminal justice, rather than zero.) Meanwhile, state Y will
supply the public good because the cost ($3 per person) is less than
the benefit ($5 per person). Finally, note that if the states merged and
supplied the public good based on a $2 tax, then each person in state
X would lose $0.50 compared to the status quo (where they lost $0),
and each person in state Y would gain $1 relative to the status quo
(where they gained $2 rather than $3).
This last point suggests that merger could occur as long as a trans-
fer could be arranged-or, what is the same thing, a variable tax is
used. Let people living in state X pay a tax of $1.25 and the people
living in state Y pay a tax of $2.75. Now the people in X gain $0.25
from the merger, and the people in Y gain $0.25 from the merger.
But transfers are not costless. They involve administrative costs
and cause economic distortions. Thus, the merger will not occur if the
costs associated with the transfer (which are themselves an increasing
function of the degree of heterogeneity) exceed the gains from ex-
ploiting economies of scale. This will sometimes be the case, but not
always.
To sum up, the size of a state is a function of scale economies and
heterogeneity costs. As scale economies increase relative to heteroge-
neity costs, the optimal size of the state increases as well."
How does this conclusion follow from the assumption that gov-
ernments are perfect agents? If governments are perfect agents, then
they will agree to divide their own state, or merge it with other states
or parts of other states, when doing so maximizes the welfare of their
own citizens, even if the governments themselves go out of business.
Thus, if scale economies are achieved through a merger, then the
states involved will merge. If, in light of heterogeneity of preferences,
states should divide, then they will and secession will be regarded as
unproblematic. This is obviously unrealistic, but the question is why it
is unrealistic, a question that I will address subsequently.
70 1 have ignored a lot of complications; readers who seek more depth should consult
Alesina and Spolaore. Id (providing a mathematical analysis of issues related to jurisdiction size,
heterogeneity, and economies of scale).
2006]
The University of Chicago Law Review
2. Imperfect governments; perfect enforcement.
a) Democracies. Democracies maximize the welfare of the
median voter, not of the entire domestic population;" therefore, de-
mocratic governments are imperfect. As a result of this imperfection,
states will tend to be too small, as shown by Alberto Alesina and En-
rico Spolaore 2
The logic is as follows. Imagine a single state that generates a
public good like criminal justice. The population is heterogeneous, so
not everyone benefits from the public good to the same degree (trans-
fers are impossible or costly). Because the government maximizes the
welfare of the median voter, it chooses the type and level of public
good that the median voter prefers. This means that the minority
might not receive much of a benefit from the public good, and could
even be harmed, because the taxation needed to fund the public good
could exceed the benefits members of the minority receive.
Suppose now that the minority lives in a border region, and can
secede if a majority of the minority votes in favor of secession. The
minority might prefer to secede rather than contribute to the public
good from which it does not benefit. The advantage of secession is that
the minority can set up its own government that will supply the type
and level of public good that the minority most prefers. The disadvan-
tage of secession is that the cost of financing cannot be spread across
as many people. Still, in imaginable cases the minority will be better-
off with its own state, and the majority will-because of the cost of
transfers-be unable to bribe the minority to remain part of the origi-
nal state, even though aggregate welfare would be maximized in a sin-
gle state.
The driving force of the analysis is that neither the majority nor
the minority have the right incentives to choose the optimal policy.
The majority externalizes costs imposed on the minority; the minor-
ity-if it has the power to secede-ignores the costs imposed on the
majority. As a result, there are too many states, and states are too
small. Secession is now morally problematic.
b) Dictatorships. The opposite is the case for dictatorships.
Dictators are assumed to want to maximize revenue subject to an in-
surrection constraint-if citizens fall below a threshold level of wel-
fare, they will revolt, which is more costly for the dictator than provid-
71 See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 52-55 (Harper & Row 1957)
(explaining that democratic governments can remain in power only by adopting policies that are
preferred by the majority of voters).
72 See Alesina and Spolaore, The Size of Nations at 17-23 (cited in note 15) (discussing
tradeoffs between government size and scope).
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ing them with the threshold level of welfare.73 If the insurrection con-
straint is low enough, dictators maximize their own welfare by control-
ling as large a population as possible: the larger the population, the
greater the source of revenue for the dictator's coffers.
One implication of this view is that dictators will exploit their
citizens not by failing to finance public goods but by taxing them.
Aside from the level of taxation and the rules that dictatorships need
to stay in power-such as restrictions on political opposition-
democracies and dictators should choose the same policies.7" It follows
that dictatorships and democracies will agree to similar kinds of inter-
national law, such as climate control pacts and trade agreements. Thus,
there is reason to think that international law will not differentiate
between democracies and dictatorships- at least for certain types of
policies. We will return to this topic later.
c) Implications. For the global welfarist, imperfect government
creates two sources of concern. First, imperfect governments choose
domestic policies that do not necessarily maximize the welfare of their
own citizens. Second, imperfect governments choose or acquiesce in
state size that does not necessarily maximize the welfare of their own
citizens. Democracies are too small; dictatorships are too large. Can
international law solve these problems?
The difficulty here is that for international law to solve these
problems, governments-which by hypothesis are imperfect-must
agree to international law that restricts their behavior. Is this possible?
To keep the analysis concrete, I consider an important albeit sporadic
issue of international law: the circumstances under which states should
recognize a secessionist movement as having established a new state.
i) All governments are democracies. Suppose at time one
that all states have the optimal size and shape. At time two, minorities
within states may choose to secede and establish their own states. At
time three, other states choose whether to recognize the existence of
the new state. If they do, they trade and cooperate with the successor
state to the same extent that they trade and cooperate with other
73 See id at 70.
74 See Casey B. Mulligan, Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Do Democracies Have
Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?, 18 J Econ Persp 51, 71 (2004) (arguing that
democratic institutions have insignificant effects on public policies). This is a controversial view;
others have argued that dictators will undersupply public goods because they do not benefit
directly from them. See, for example, Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Com-
munist and Capitalist Dictatorships 111-34 (Basic 2000) (using Stalinist economic policies to
model the decisions of dictators). See also Thrlinn Eggertsson, Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities
and Limits of Reform 60-62 (Michigan 2005) (discussing Olson). My argument does not require
that the (nonelectoral, nontax) policies of dictatorships and democracies converge completely,
but that they converge a sufficient amount.
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states. If they do not, they refuse to trade or cooperate with the suc-
cessor state, in which case the welfare of the citizens of the successor
state falls drastically.
We can imagine a welfare-maximizing recognition law." States
would have the obligation to recognize successor states if and only if
the joint welfare of citizens of the original and successor states ex-
ceeds the joint welfare of those citizens if no secession occurred. As a
practical matter, the judgment would depend on the degree of hetero-
geneity of citizens and scale economies. If the members of the succes-
sor state are religiously, linguistically, ethnically, and culturally very
different from the members of the rump state, then recognition would
be more likely. If the division of the states would deprive citizens of
important public goods-like a large internal market-then recogni-
tion would be less likely. In sum, by withholding recognition of pre-
cipitate secessions, states could in theory enhance global welfare.
ii) All governments are dictatorships. A similar analysis
would apply in the all-dictatorship case. States would have the obliga-
tion to recognize secessions only when they are welfare-maximizing
for citizens of the successor state and the original state. Because the
territory of dictatorships tends to be too large in the first place, the
optimal recognition rule might well require foreign states to recognize
separatist movements more quickly if they separate from dictatorships
than if they separate from democracies. To see why, recall that dicta-
tors allow all citizens (except a small group of supporters) only
enough welfare to prevent insurrections. A separatist group will se-
cede as long as it receives more than that. As for the citizens of the
rump state, they will be made no worse-off, as the dictator will con-
tinue providing them with the minimum amount of welfare. Thus, the
dictator himself will suffer the loss from secession.
iii) A mix of democracies and dictatorships. The comments
above indicate that optimal recognition law would generally require
states to recognize secessions from dictatorships, but to recognize se-
cessions from democracies only when the population is sufficiently
heterogeneous and scale economies are sufficiently low.
75 I am referring to the law governing the recognition of states, not governments. See Re-
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 202 (1987) (proposing
rules on the recognition of states). The assumption in the text is that states would refuse to coop-
erate with states that they do not recognize; the reality is more complicated.
76 See Alesina and Spolaore, The Size of Nations at 70 (cited in note 15).
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3. Imperfect governments; imperfect enforcement.
Imperfect enforcement occurs because governments may not
gain anything from enforcing international law. The best case for en-
forcement occurs when two states are engaged in bilateral coopera-
tion. If one state violates a treaty, the other state will likely retaliate.
When the law benefits all or many states, and one state violates the
law, the incentive of any other state to retaliate may be minimal. This
is the familiar problem of collective action as it applies to interna-
tional cooperation.
The best case for enforcement of globally welfare-maximizing
recognition law would occur in the two-state case. Imagine two bor-
dering states, each of which is a democracy and each of which has a
separatist movement. One could imagine the following deal between
the two states: each state promises not to recognize a separatist move-
ment in the other state. If this promise is made public, then the incen-
tive to secede may be substantially reduced; a new state that is not
recognized as such by other states-which refuse to cooperate with
it-is not likely to be viable. Separatists would do better by working
for political reform within the structure of the existing state.
The deal is not necessarily welfare-maximizing, however. After
all, the median voter in each state (in effect) agrees to the deal, and,
by hypothesis, the median voter does not take account of the interests
of the minority. For the rule to be jointly welfare-maximizing, it would
be necessary for the median voter not to know whether he or she is
likely to want to secede or to prevent secession at the time the deal is
made." This, of course, is highly unlikely and unlikely to be sustainable
in any event.
But the broader problem is that such two-state deals are unlikely
to deter secession. The reason is that the separatist movement can
seek recognition and cooperation from the rest of the world. If the
two original states in question refuse to cooperate with the successor
state, this just means that the opportunities for cooperation are that
much greater for other states. For example, if the successor state has
unexploited mineral resources, the rest of the world will be eager to
cooperate with it so that foreign companies will be able to exploit the
resources. The collective action problem thus suggests that enforce-
ment will be weak or nonexistent.
77 Consider Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J
399, 403 (2001) (arguing that behind a "veil of ignorance" of constitutional dimensions "the
decisionmaker afflicted with uncertainty will, for lack of ex post information about whose inter-
ests to favor, choose the option or rule that impartially promotes the good of all those affected in
an ex ante sense").
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4. Evidence: law and history.
In principle, recognition law could be used to maximize global
welfare. States would have an obligation to recognize separatist
movements quickly if they claim secession from dictatorships and to
recognize separatist movements slowly and reluctantly if they claim
secession from democracies." It is unlikely, however, that states have
the right incentives to do so. Dictatorships have no particular interest
in aiding democracies, and democracies could implement the optimal
rule only if they could overcome severe collective action problems.
For this reason, it is not surprising that international law does not gen-
erally oblige states to recognize or refuse to recognize new states (ex-
cept to the extent limited by the principle of sovereignty).79 Nonethe-
less, the principles and tradeoffs I have been discussing have impor-
tant historical precedents.
Governments have long recognized that secession can be both
desirable and problematic. The principle of self-determination ad-
vanced by President Wilson recognized that national borders during
World War I were not necessarily just-in our terms, welfare-
maximizing. Wilson believed that ethnically homogenous populations
should have the right to break off from existing imperial structures and
establish their own states.'O In tension with the principle of self-
determination, states have long acknowledged that they should not
encourage separatist movements in foreign states-this follows from
the principle of sovereignty." When secessions nonetheless occur, the
78 This conclusion is an example of how a welfarist analysis diverges from the views of
someone who takes a rights-based view. See Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination
at 451-53 (cited in note 10) (rejecting the proposition that "state majoritarianism is necessary for
legitimacy in international law"); Barry, Statism and Nationalism at 56 (cited in note 18)
("[Closmopolitan nationalism has no principled position on boundaries. If the breakup of an
existing state would make the maintenance of liberal institutions easier ... there is no reason for
a cosmopolitan to oppose it."). However, the rights theorist must also explain what amount of
welfare losses are tolerable in order "to make the maintenance of liberal institutions easier."
Barry, Statism and Nationalism at 56.
79 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 202.
80 See Woodrow Wilson, Address of the President, 65th Cong, 2d Sess, in 56 Cong Rec H
690-91 (Jan 8, 1918) (Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech). See also Frank Ninkovich,
The Wilsonian Century: US. Foreign Policy Since 1900 288-89 (Chicago 1999) (discussing the
relevance of Wilsonian self-determination in the post-Cold War international system). This
principle was eventually accepted by states for the limited purpose of supporting indigenous
separatist movements claiming independence from colonial powers. See Reference re Secession
of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 222-23 (Canada) (distinguishing the Quebecois secession from
decolonization because "Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial people").
81 See, for example, Lawrence M. Frankel, International Law of Secession: New Rules for a
New Era, 14 Houston J Intl L 521, 535-38 (1992) ("The community of states often acts as a
closely knit club determined to aid its members against threats from outsiders, i.e. stateless peo-
ple represented by independence movements.").
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law is simply that states may do whatever they want: they may recog-
nize the new state, or not, however it might serve their interests."
There have been occasional efforts to advance a new principle that
new states will be recognized only if they resped human rights and
are democratic, but this principle does not have many adherents.83
The principle of self-determination reflects the idea that ho-
mogenous populations are, all else equal, easier to govern than het-
erogeneous populations; thus, states should tend to be homogenous.
The principle of sovereignty reflects the idea that every state is subject
to centrifugal forces that may reduce rather than enhance welfare; it
thus may be best for other states not to encourage separatism within a
given state. The efforts to condition recognition on democracy and
human rights reflect the idea that people living in dictatorships are
worse-off than people living in democracies. But the failure to embody
these ideas in workable international law reflects the problem of col-
lective action. Bilateral processes cannot, except in unusual circum-
stances, be used to implement these ideas. The effort to condition in-
ternational recognition on the adoption of democracy can succeed
only if all or nearly all states agree to enforce the rule-for a separa-
tist movement needs only a few cooperative partners in order to be
self-sustaining. But because of free riding, such a legal system has not
come into existence."
B. Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty arose briefly in the discussion of se-
cession, above, but it has more general importance. In this Part, I ex-
plore the ways in which sovereignty reflects an institutionally con-
strained, global welfare-maximizing conception of international law.
As noted above," sovereignty is an ambiguous concept, but it isgenerally understood to mean the right of a state to be free from in-
82 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 202.
83 See Lori F. Damrosch, et al, International Law: Cases and Materials 258-61 (West 4th ed
2001) (describing diplomatic efforts to make adherence to democratic principles and human
rights a condition of statehood).
84 An interesting, related question is whether the analysis above has implications for the
international law of migration. On the one hand, heterogeneity of preference argues in favor of
free migration: individuals will sort themselves into groups with similar preferences, reducing the
cost of distributing the gains from government action. On the other hand, individuals fleeing
oppressive or incompetent governments may put strains on the states in which they seek ref-
uge-they might increase the heterogeneity of the recipient state's population if their main
reason for migration is to escape oppression. It might be better if they-being forced to stay
put-were given an incentive to pressure their own government to improve. How these and
other factors balance out is best left to future research.
85 See Part III.B.
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tefference from other states and the corresponding duty not to inter-
fere with the governance of other states.6 A clear example of a viola-
tion of sovereignty is a military invasion, in which one state's military
forces enter the territory of another state without that other state's
consent. Flying through the airspace of another state, or sending ships
through its territorial waters, without its consent, is also a violation of
sovereignty. There are many more ambiguous examples, such as using
the radio to propagandize across borders or, as noted above, providing
aid or encouragement to separatist movements."
1. Perfect governments; perfect enforcement.
If governments are perfect, then states will have the optimal size,
and optimal policies will be chosen within their borders. In particular,
governments will tax citizens and use the money to produce public
goods that benefit all their citizens.
Governments will, however, have a strong incentive both to ex-
ternalize costs on other states, and to free ride on the public good
production of other states. As an example of the first, a perfect domes-
tic welfare-maximizing government would locate industrial zones up-
wind from borders, so that the pollution will harm foreigners rather
than citizens. As an example of the second, such a government might
encourage its citizens to travel to other states in order to acquire
technological knowledge generated by foreign states' investment in
research.
One way to understand the concept of sovereignty is as a recogni-
tion of the central role of the state in producing public goods. Public
goods cannot be efficiently produced unless states can control who
pays for them and who benefits from them. A sovereign state has the
formal legal right to object if another state either externalizes costs
across its borders or, by encouraging its citizens or otherwise, free
rides on the first state's production of collective goods. Sovereignty
allows the victim state in the first case to demand that the pollution be
reduced, and the victim state in the second case to close its borders to
the citizens of the free riding government.
2. Imperfect governments; perfect enforcement.
As many commentators have noted, however, sovereignty also al-
lows governments to abuse their own citizens. Suppose that state X
persecutes members of a religious minority. People in state Y object.
86 See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values 8-12 (Nijhoff 1995).
87 See Part IV.A.4.
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Under the principle of sovereignty, state Y would not be able to send
an army to state X in order to protect the religious minority. Thus,
many people have argued that sovereignty should yield in certain cir-
cumstances-for example, when a government commits atrocities
against its own citizens."
The problem with this view is that it is in tension with the as-
sumption of having a state system (as opposed to a world govern-
ment) in the first place-that people living in a particular territory are
better-off if they have their own government than if they are a small
part of a world state. Recall that the rationale here is that given the
heterogeneity of the world population, public goods are created more
efficiently at a national level than at a global level. The supposition
that state Y's government will act in the interest of people living in
state X by protecting them against X's government violates the as-
sumption that states should be separate.9
We can avoid this problem by assuming that people in state Y
have an altruistic interest in the well-being of people living in state X
or, more generally, that altruistic concerns transcend national borders.
If this assumption is correct, then there exists a global public good-
all people having greater than a minimum level of well-being. States
would rationally agree to a treaty regime that creates this public good,
and indeed the human rights regime could be interpreted in this fash-
ion. Such a theory would not necessarily justify humanitarian inter-
vention, but it would justify some kind of sanctioning system that
would be targeted against states that commit atrocities against their
own citizens.
Many scholars argue that dictatorships should enjoy less sover-
eignty: they should be excluded from the benefits of membership in
international organizations "° or even subject to invasion by liberal de-
mocracies, which would then install a democratic regime.9' This argu-
ment is vulnerable to many practical objections: it is unclear that for-
eign states can successfully install democratic institutions; invasions
might result in civil war; adequate interventions may be too expensive
and risky; and so forth. But for present purposes the most difficult
problem with this view is that it is in tension with interstate coopera-
tion. Suppose, for example, that a successful treaty that reduced global
warming needed the participation of China. If China must be excluded
88 See text accompanying note 16.
89 See text accompanying note 15.
90 See, for example, Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination at 452-53 (cited
in note 10).
91 See, for example, Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations at 90-92 (cited in
note 48) (positing that "unjust" states could be subject to intervention under certain conditions).
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from international organizations, or even invaded, because of its au-
thoritarian system, then global climate regulation cannot be achieved.
If China is included, then a dictatorship has benefited from interna-
tional cooperation. This problem is ubiquitous in international rela-
tions because even small countries have very important resources, are
needed for international goals (for example, tracking down terrorists
who hide in them), and can easily dissolve into anarchy if invaded or
isolated. As a result, the optimal sovereignty rule is ambiguous: it
might favor treating dictatorships like democracies (so that global
collective goods can be created through cooperation in the short
term) or treating dictatorships as pariahs (in order to encourage re-
gime change for the sake of the dictatorship's population).W
3. Imperfect governments; imperfect enforcement.
Enforcement problems, however, seriously complicate this analy-
sis. We can point to two distinct problems.
First, what motives do foreign governments have for intervening?
Even if they are perfect, they will intervene only if intervention im-
proves the welfare of domestic citizens. If the foreign governments are
imperfect, they may intervene even when doing so does not enhance
the welfare (altruistic or otherwise) of their citizens. If the law relaxes
sovereignty when a humanitarian crisis occurs then foreign states-
taking advantage of the law-may intervene but not in order to allevi-
ate the humanitarian crisis. They may intervene for other strategic
reasons. This is the pretext problem."
Second, even if foreign governments are altruistic, there is a free
rider problem. If a humanitarian crisis in state X can be solved
through elimination of the government of X, then all states (assuming
altruism) benefit from the elimination of that government. Thus, every
state maximizes its welfare by refusing to intervene in the hope that
some other state will intervene. Even if some intervention occurs, it is
likely to be less than what would be optimal. Further, states are likely
to free ride in punishing states that fail to intervene, or that intervene
but do so for strategic reasons (that make things worse) rather than
for altruistic reasons.
92 This problem confronts humanitarian organizations as well, which must decide whether
to cooperate with dictatorships (so that they are permitted to aid populations under the dictator-
ships' control) or to refuse to cooperate with them (so that the dictatorships do not indirectly
benefit from the aid). They generally do the former. See generally David Rieff, A Bed for the
Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (Simon & Schuster 2002) (introducing a journalistic account of
the "humanitarian paradox" posed by humanitarian organizations' dealings with dictatorships).
93 See Part II.
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These problems are not decisive, but they illustrate the risks. A
rule of exceptionless or absolute sovereignty would allow govern-
ments to abuse their own citizens but (assuming imperfect enforce-
ment) discourage governments from invading other countries using
humanitarianism as a pretext. A rule that permits or requires humani-
tarian interventions would discourage governments from abusing their
citizens but encourage governments to launch invasions for strategic
reasons.
4. Evidence: law and history.
As noted, many elements of international law reflect altruistic
concern for the well-being of people living across borders. Human
rights treaties oblige states to respect certain human rights4 Interna-
tional humanitarian law reduces the brutality of war.9 International
criminal law makes individuals liable for committing certain atroci-
ties.' And, as discussed in Part II, some commentators support a right
of humanitarian intervention.
However, these legal regimes are weak and rarely enforced. His-
tory suggests two reasons why. First, although cross-border altruism
exists, it is minimal. Foreign aid, which is the most direct evidence of
altruism, is very low, and usually tied to strategic goals." Humanitarian
interventions have been rare and limited. The clearest recent example
of humanitarian intervention was America's ill-fated famine relief op-
eration in Somalia; the United States withdrew after a small number of
combat deaths." Most other examples cited in the literature actually
reflect mixed motives. The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia and
94 See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Res
2200A (XXI), 21 GAOR Supp No 16 at 52-58,999 UNTS 171 (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force
Mar 23, 1976).
95 See, for example, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 1955 6 UST 3516, TIAS No 3365 (1949).
96 See, for example, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (July 17, 1998), UN Doc A/CONF 183/9, reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998).
97 See Wojciech Kopczuk, Joel Slemrod, and Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Limitations of Decen-
tralized World Redistribution: An Optimal Taxation Approach, 49 Eur Econ Rev 1051, 1054
(2005) (arguing that American aid policy implicitly values foreigners at 1/2000th the value of an
American life). See also Jean-Sdbastien Rioux and Douglas A. Van Belle, The Influence of Le
Monde Coverage on French Foreign Aid Allocations, 49 Intl Stud Q 481,495-96 (2005) (conclud-
ing that French aid is not related to the wealth of the recipient; rather it is related to newspaper
coverage, democracy, and use of the French language). But see Alberto Alesina and David Dol-
lar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, 5 J Econ Growth 33,55-56 (2000) ("After con-
trolling for its special interest in Egypt and Israel, U.S. aid is targeted to poverty, democracy, and
openness").
98 See Donatella Lorch, Last of the US. Troops Leave Somalia; What Began as a Mission of
Mercy Closes with Little Ceremony, NY Times sec 1 at 1 (Mar 26,1994).
2006]
The University of Chicago Law Review
the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda may have helped the citizens in
the invaded states, but the purpose of the invasions was security.9 The
Kosovo example is more complicated, but the contrast between inter-
vention in Kosovo and the failure to intervene in Rwanda in 1994 and
Darfur today suggests that regional security, not humanitarianism, is
the distinguishing factor.'m
Second, to the extent that all people are altruistic, all people
benefit when atrocities in a foreign state are halted: this suggests a
collective action problem. Even if preventing genocide in Rwanda
benefits all states, all states would be even better-off if other states
took the considerable risk of sending in military troops. The interna-
tional legal regime has not been able to overcome this problem of
collective action.
As a practical and legal matter, then, sovereignty remains robust
even though in a world with perfect governments (putting aside the
governments that commit atrocities) and perfect enforcement, sover-
eignty would be limited so that states could not commit atrocities
against their own citizens. The problem is not so much that govern-
ments are imperfect but that altruism is limited and collective action
problems are severe.
C. Cooperation
Global welfarism implies that states should cooperate with each
other in order to produce supranational (regional or global) public
goods such as climate control and trade. There is no such obligation to
cooperate because states have strong nonlegal incentives to cooperate,
but there is an important regime governing the creation, interpreta-
tion, and enforcement of treaties.
1. Perfect governments; perfect enforcement.
Why should states cooperate? Let's consider a simple example. A
territory contains a factory and a resident who lives downwind. When
the factory operates, it produces a benefit for its owner (B) and a cost
to the downwind resident (C). Operation of the factory is desirable if
and only if B > C.
If the factory and the resident occupy the territory of a single
state, the government of the state can create a law that ensures that
the factory operates only if it is socially desirable. For example, a law
that provides that the factory may operate only if B > C is socially
99 See Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power at 80-82 (cited in note 52).
100 See James Traub, Never Again, No Longer?, NY Times sec 6 at 17 (July 18,2004).
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desirable; so is a law that requires the factory to pay C to the victim if
it operates. In the latter case, the factory will internalize the social cost
of its operations and operate only if B > C. In addition, the state could
determine whether the factory's operations are socially beneficial and
pass a law banning operation of the factory if they are not.
Suppose now that the factory is in state X, and the pollution it
generates crosses a border and harms a person who lives in state Y.
From the perspective of global welfare, it remains the case that a law
that forces factory owners to internalize the costs of production is de-
sirable. However, state X no longer has an incentive to pass such a law.
The problem is that state X's citizen-the factory owner-is harmed
by a law that penalizes the factory for polluting, and no one in state X
benefits from such a law. Therefore, state X will not pass such a law.
State Y's citizen is victimized by the pollution, but state Y gains
nothing by passing an antipollution law because state Y has no control
over the factory owner. Perhaps state Y will try to bribe state X to
pass the law. If the victim is injured more than the factory owner gains,
the bribe might be possible. But it might not. I will return to this issue
shortly.
Suppose that each state has a factory and a citizen. State X's fac-
tory pollutes the drinking water of state Y's citizen; and state Y's fac-
tory pollutes the drinking water of state X's citizen. Would each state
pass globally welfare-maximizing laws?
If they are unable to cooperate, the answer is no. State X's law
benefits no one in state X and harms state X's factory owner. There-
fore state X will not pass the law. The same logic ensures that state Y
also does not pass a law.
However, state X and state Y could agree to enter a treaty pro-
viding that each state must pass a law restricting pollution. The treaty
could provide that each state must pass a law prohibiting pollution if
the benefits (to the factory owner in the state) are less than the costs
(to the citizens in both states). In other words, the treaty would re-
quire each state to act as if cross-border costs were actually incurred
by its own citizens.
If the two states can cooperate in this fashion, then the outcome
is globally welfare-maximizing to the same extent as the welfare-
maximizing outcome in the one-state case. But this is an exceptionally
simple case. In the real world, there are two obstacles to cooperation:
asymmetry and third-country effects.
a) Asymmetry. By asymmetry, I mean that the cost-benefit ra-
tio is different for each state. Suppose, for example, that the factory in
state X (which I will call factory X) produces an in-state benefit of
fifty and an out-of-state cost of one hundred. Factory Y produces an
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in-state benefit of fifty and an out-of-state cost of ten. Table 1 provides
the numbers.
TABLE 1
Welfare Effect in X Welfare Effect in Y GlobalEffect
Owner Victim Owner Victim
Factory in X 50 0 0 -100 -50
Factory in Y 0 -10 50 0 40
Both 40 -50 -10
Consider a treaty that bans all pollution. Such a treaty would
benefit Y (whose factory loses fifty but whose citizen gains one hun-
dred) but would harm X (whose factory loses fifty but whose citizen
gains only ten). Thus, X would refuse to enter such a treaty. Or con-
sider a treaty that permits only cost-justified pollution. Such a treaty
would benefit Y (whose factory loses zero but whose citizen gains one
hundred) but would harm X (whose factory loses fifty and whose citi-
zen gains zero). X also would reject this treaty.
It is possible that Y could persuade X to sign one of these treaties
(preferably the second) by making a side payment to X. Suppose that
Y says that if X agrees to enter a treaty banning cost-unjustified pollu-
tion, then Y will pay X somewhere between fifty and one hundred.
Both states would be better-off after such a deal than in the status
quo. However, states rarely make side payments of this sort to each
other, and the reason is probably that they create perverse incentives.
If state X knows that Y will pay it to reduce pollution, then it might
encourage its entrepreneurs to set up factories close to the border
with Y and then threaten to operate them unless Y pays X more
money. I will return to this problem later."'
b) Third-country effects. Two states might cooperate with each
other with the purpose of injuring third states. The Nazi-Soviet pact,
which carved up Poland, is one such example. Other examples are less
dramatic but no less important. Trade economists have long recog-
nized that a bilateral free trade pact can result in trade diversion that
may destroy the welfare effects of the pact."' Briefly, when states X
and Y agree to reduce tariffs while excluding Z, X and Y may produce
and export to each other products that are more cheaply manufac-
tured by Z because the tariff reduction offsets Z's competitive advan-
tage. In theory, the aggregate welfare of the three countries could be
101 See Part IV.C.3.
102 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade Today 106-18 (Princeton 2002) (discussing the sys-
temic impact of trade diversion resulting from the proliferation of trade pacts).
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lower than if all three have higher but equal tariffs. But even when
this does not occur, third-party effects can result in delay and other
distortions, as states fight to avoid being excluded while trying to ex-
clude others.
There is no bilateral solution; only a multilateral treaty regime
could solve this problem. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATI)/World Trade Organization (WTO) system is such an effort:
the most-favored nation system ensures that X, Y, and Z, in our exam-
ple, all have the same tariffs. But the GATT/WTO system is vulner-
able to free riding, and, indeed, trade diversion has been accomplished
through regional trade agreements.
' °
Regardless of whether the international trade regime should be
considered a success, the larger point is that bilateral cooperation can-
not by itself solve collective action problems, and indeed may exacer-
bate them by providing additional ways for states to harm third coun-
tries-as the Nazi-Soviet pact shows. "
c) Summary. Perfect governments will enter treaties in order
to produce collective goods, but even with perfect enforcement there
are significant obstacles to international welfare-maximization. One
obstacle is the asymmetry of payoffs: states will not enter globally wel-
fare-maximizing treaties if one state loses. Although side payments
could in principle solve this problem, side payments are often hard to
administer or invite misbehavior. The other obstacle is the third-
country effect: cooperation among two states can reduce global wel-
fare because of the ubiquity of externalities in the international set-
ting and the absence of institutions to correct them.
2. Imperfect governments; perfect enforcement.
Because governments are imperfect, the treaties they enter may
not reflect the interests of all their citizens. The Holy Alliance of
1815,", for example, was a treaty among authoritarian states-Russia,
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Prussia-that obliged each to ren-
der assistance to the other in case a state's own people threatened its
103 See Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law at 149 (cited in note 13)
("Although states do not explicitly violate the rule, they circumvent it easily by creating prefer-
ential trading areas ... of which there are hundreds. NAFTA is just one example.").
104 It is a mistake to assume that treaties are just like domestic contracts and therefore
presumptively welfare-maximizing because parties would not make the agreement if they did
not believe that it would make them better-off. Domestic contracts take place in heavily regu-
lated markets: courts and agencies guard against contracts that generate externalities-for ex-
ample, under the antitrust laws. In addition, domestic markets are much thicker with easier entry
and exit.
105 See Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 558-59
(Oxford 1994).
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monarchy. Such a treaty protected the ruling elites at the expense of
the general public. A more timely example is the WTO, which-
according to its critics -benefits export industries at the expense of
consumers, farmers, and workers." Another modem example is sover-
eign debt incurred by ruling elites in order to finance their own lavish
lifestyle rather than development for the sake of taxpayers who even-
tually have to pay back the principal plus interest. °7
One interesting question is whether such welfare-reducing trea-
ties should be enforceable. To see why this question matters, suppose
that two dictatorships enter a treaty that reduces the welfare of both
populations. Subsequently, one of the states goes through a regime
change. The resulting government is democratic.0  The government
would like to repudiate the treaty; may it?
The usual answer is no. To take a typical example, a democratic
state may not repudiate sovereign debt incurred by a prior dictatorship
for the personal gain of its leaders.'6 If it does so, it risks a sanction. But
why shouldn't states be permitted to escape such bad treaties?
One possible answer is that even dictatorships -and certainly
less-imperfect governments- will enter most treaties for domestically
welfare-maximizing reasons. Recall that dictators do not have an in-
centive to forgo policies that generate public goods; they do best by
choosing those policies and then exploiting their citizens through the
tax system." Thus, when dictators enter treaties, the presumption
should be that the treaties are designed to maximize welfare, not in-
jure their citizens. To be sure, the citizens will rarely benefit, or benefit
much from such treaties, but they will not be hurt by them. At the same
time, some treaties like these will benefit citizens in some cases, and
almost always benefit the citizens of democratic counterparties. So a
general rule in favor of enforcement seems to be welfare-maximizing."'
106 But see Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works ch 10 (Yale 2004) (discussing and cri-
tiquing the anti-VTO literature).
107 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents 243-44 (Norton 2002) (observ-
ing that Cold War loans to the Democratic Republic of Congo were used to enrich its leader
rather than to fund development).
108 See generally, for example, Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun-
gary v Slovakia), 1997 ICJ 7 (involving Hungary's effort to escape a communist-era treaty with
Czechoslovakia that obligated both states to develop a massive hydroelectric power plant on the
Danube).
109 See Craig S. Smith, Major Creditors Agree to Cancel 80% of Iraq Debt, NY Times Al
(Nov 22,2004) (observing that Iraq would still be obliged to pay Hussein-era debts without debt
relief by creditors).
110 See Alesina and Spolaore, The Size of Nations at 70 (cited in note 15).
111 Putting aside third-country effects.
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3. Imperfect governments; imperfect enforcement.
Enforcement and administrative difficulties may undermine the
value of a treaty. Imagine that state X and state Y enter a treaty pro-
hibiting cost-unjustified pollution with a side payment. New factories
are constructed on the territory of Y, and these factories emit pollu-
tion that crosses the border. X protests, but Y argues either that the
pollution is cost-justified, or that the factories are not of the type gov-
erned by the treaty. How is the dispute to be resolved?
In the one-state example, we know that the victims of pollution
can bring a lawsuit against the factory owners. "2 The court will resolve
the dispute, and-even if the court misinterprets the law-the law can
be modified by the legislature. But the treaty in question did not es-
tablish a dispute resolution mechanism, and as long as Y can plausibly
claim that the pollution is cost-justified (we assume that an implausi-
ble claim will be treated as a treaty violation, resulting in a reputa-
tional sanction of some sort), X will have no remedy. Nor is renegotia-
tion of the treaty likely to solve the problem: Y will refuse to renego-
tiate unless X offers a new side payment.
X and Y could try to anticipate this problem by providing in the
treaty that a tribunal will hear any disputes-either an existing inter-
national tribunal such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or a
new tribunal established for the occasion. However, the ICJ has
proven a disappointment and new tribunals are unlikely to be effec-
tive."3 The reason is that human beings must make the decision, and
the tribunal staff must come from X or Y or both (or neither). If the
tribunal members are loyal to their own government, then the tribunal
will either deadlock or find for whichever state has more representa-
tion."' Anticipating such an outcome, the states will be reluctant to
agree to the tribunal, and indeed effective tribunals are rare. ' Relying
on people who are not nationals of either party is also unacceptably
112 See Part IV.C.1.
113 See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice 6-12 (John M. Olin
Law & Economics Working Paper No 233, Dec 2004), online at http:// ssm.comlabstract=629341
(visited Mar 26,2006).
114 See Eric A. Posner and Miguel ER de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice
Biased?, 34 J Legal Stud 599, 624-25 (2005) (finding evidence of national bias in decisionmak-
ing). See also Erik Voeten, Judicial Behavior on International Courts: The European Court of
Human Rights 19-21 (unpublished manuscript 2005), online at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=705363 (visited Mar 26, 2006) (finding evidence of modest national bias
among judges of the ECHR).
115 See Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
Cal L Rev 1, 29-51 (2005) (discussing low success rates in international tribunals based on usage
and compliance rates).
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risky because such people cannot usually be trusted to take account of
the parties' interests."6
All of these problems could be solved, in principle, if state X and
state Y merged into a single state. Consider the example in Table 1
above. If X and Y merge into a single state, which I will call "XY," then
all the factories and all the residents are now subject to the same gov-
ernment. If the government seeks to maximize the welfare of its citi-
zens, then it will pass legislation that ensures that the socially optimal
level of pollution is created. Factory X will shut down, and Factory Y
will stay open.
If merger would solve these problems, why don't state X and
state Y merge? State X and state Y will merge only if the governments
of both states believe that merger will enhance the welfare of their
citizens. In our example, merger will enhance the welfare of victim Y
by one hundred and reduce the welfare of Factory Y by fifty, so we
might imagine that the government of Y would agree to the merger.
However, merger would enhance the welfare of victim X by only ten
and reduce the welfare of Factory X by one hundred, so the govern-
ment of X would reject the merger. To be sure, a merger with side
payments might be possible, but it might also be difficult.
In addition, merger would solve the enforcement and administra-
tive problems discussed above. The government of XY could pass laws
that regulate pollution, set up an agency with the power to create and
enforce rules, provide for adjudication, enforce the laws, and so forth.
However, all of these functions could benefit the residents of former
state X more than the residents of former state Y or vice versa. If the
governments of these states anticipate such asymmetric effects before
they merge, then they might not agree to merge in the first place.
In sum, the treaty rule to which states X and Y would agree is
likely to be inferior to the domestic law that merged state XY would
pass. If the ideal rule provides that factories may pollute only when
benefits exceed costs, then state XY may well be able to incorporate
this rule in domestic law, but the treaty between states X and Y would
likely provide a weaker rule-for example, restricting only certain
types of heavily polluting factories, particularly heavy pollution, facto-
ries close to the border, or factories in certain regions. To be sure, the
treaty rule will be better than no treaty at all.
There are two implications here. First, the practical significance of
this result is that we should not be surprised by the weakness and im-
perfection of treaties-such as the Kyoto Protocol-or the weaker
116 Consider id at 72-74.
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version of Kyoto to which the United States would agree. "' Treaties,
unlike domestic law, must not only be welfare-maximizing; they must
also be Pareto superior. The more states that are involved, and the
more heterogeneous their positions, the weaker the treaties will be.
Second, we should rarely observe treaties that redistribute wealth
from one state to another. Every treaty creates a surplus, but the sur-
plus will be distributed to parties according to their bargaining power,
not their need. This being the case, there is no point in demanding that
treaties like the Kyoto Protocol require some states to make sacrifices
while not requiring other states to: states will not agree to such a re-
sult. If a wealthy state wants to provide aid to a poor state, it can best
do this by providing direct aid, as I will discuss below.
4. Evidence: law and history.
Both of these observations are supported by history. Most treaties
impose weak obligations and do not have asymmetric distributive im-
pacts."' Despite some claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that
international law recognizes a duty on the part of wealthy states to
accept greater international obligations than poor states do."9 In addi-
tion, as noted above,'0 international law does not distinguish treaties
that more or less imperfect governments ratify: all are enforceable
under international law except (ambiguously) if they violate jus co-
gens norms such as the norm against genocide.'2'
As for the third-country effect, I have already discussed the way
that the international trade regime has tried to cabin bilateral coop-
eration that harms third countries. Another example is the UN collec-
tive security system, which was supposed to replace the bilateral (or
low-number) security pacts that contributed to the First and Second
World Wars. But if these two multilateral regimes provide evidence
that states recognize the danger of third-country effects, they do not
show that this danger can be overcome. The problem is that the third-
country problem can be solved only through collective action involv-
ing all or nearly all states, and collective action of this scope and mag-
nitude may not be possible. The international trade regime shows am-
117 See generally Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Third Session, Held at Kyoto
From I to 11 December 1997, Addendum, Part Two:Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties
at Its Third Session, Conference of the Parties (Dec 11, 1997), UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1.
118 See Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law at 150-51 (cited in note 13)
(arguing that treaties are weak and do not redistribute wealth or power).
119 See Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International
Law, 98 Am J Intl L 276,299-301 (2004) (concluding that although there has been a recent push
for differentiating obligations, it has not been accepted as a new normative principle).
120 See Part IV.B.
121 On jus cogens, see Damrosch, et al, International Law at 105-06 (cited in note 83).
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biguous success-but probably because only three players, the EU,
Japan, and the United States, really matter. Whether the trade system
can survive a larger number of equal players remains to be seen. The
collective security system has largely failed to achieve the goals of its
founders. There are regional successes -including NATO, the EU sys-
tem, and NAFTA-but these successes are based either on the small
number of parties or the dominance of a few large parties.
Finally, there is no general rule of international law that the trea-
ties of dictatorships are less enforceable than the treaties of democra-
cies. On the contrary, international law has always been clear that in-
ternational obligations do not turn on the political regime of a state."
D. Aid
Wealthier states have no international legal obligation to provide
aid to poorer states, although wealth disparities are vast, far greater
than intrastate wealth disparities that uncontroversially result in do-
mestic redistributive legislation. Wealthier states do provide aid to
other states, and usually to poor (but not always the poorest) states,
but on a voluntary basis. Global welfare-maximization implies signifi-
cant redistribution, far greater than what exists today, at least if the
transfers actually reach the poor and are not confiscated by dictators
or corrupt bureaucrats.
1. Perfect governments; perfect enforcement.
Here, we see the starkest contrast between the implications of
global welfare-maximization and the limitations that result from the
requirement of state consent. Assume first that the citizens of wealthy
states are not altruistic toward poor people living in foreign states (or
are able to exhaust their altruism through private contributions).
Wealthy states would, then, refuse to agree to international law that
required them to transfer resources to foreign states because such a
law would make the populations of wealthy states worse off. Assume
now that citizens have some altruism toward foreign citizens. In prin-
ciple, wealthy states would not object to international law that re-
quires them to donate aid, as long as the level of donation does not
exceed the extent of their citizens' altruism.
Although such an international law would not injure wealthy
states, there is also no affirmative reason for it. Wealthy states could
simply donate of their own free will. A treaty might help donor states
122 See Stone, 98 Am J Intl L at 299 (cited in note 119) ("In general, the terms of customary
international law and multilateral conventions apply universally.").
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coordinate their giving, but this could probably be done informally, as
there are only about a dozen or so states that provide significant aid.
A treaty would also require the donor states to have similar altruistic
interests, which is not clear.
2. Imperfect governments; perfect enforcement.
Imperfect donor governments may donate too much or too little
aid, relative to what is welfare-maximizing for their populations, but
the more serious problem is the imperfection of donee governments.
It is widely agreed that much-perhaps most-foreign aid has been
squandered because it has been confiscated by donee governments,
lost to corruption, or misused in some way.123
Consider a donee government that is a dictatorship. Subject to
the insurrection constraint, it keeps all surpluses from government
policy for itself. A na've donor government that gave money to the
donee government would not maximize welfare, for the donee gov-
ernment would keep the money for itself and not give any money to
its citizens. Because the leader and high officials of the donee gov-
ernment are already wealthy, the donation would not enhance welfare.
One possible solution to this problem is to make future donations
conditional on the proper use of the current donation. Suppose, for
example, that the donor government says that it will give $1 million to
the donee government. If this money is not used for food aid for poor
citizens then the donor government will not in the future donate any
more money.
There are two problems with this solution. First, the increased
food aid may substitute for some other good that goes toward satisfac-
tion of the insurrection constraint. Suppose, for example, that the dic-
tatorship already maintains medical clinics for the poor-in part to
discourage insurrection. If the dictatorship now is required to give
food to the poor-so that the insurrection constraint is exceeded-the
dictatorship would rationally reduce medical care. Thus, the donation
would not enhance the welfare of the poor.
Second, the dictatorship may give a very small amount to the
poor, keep the rest for itself, and then inform the donor government
that people will starve unless the donor makes a new donation. This is
a version of the Samaritan's dilemma.'23 Donor nations may be able to
123 See Sharon LaFraniere, Africa Tackles Graft, with Billions in Aid in Play, NY Times Al
(July 6,2005).
124 An example is the Bush administration's millennium project. See Elisabeth Bumiller,
Bush Plans to Raise Foreign Aid and Tie It to Reforms, NY Times A8 (Mar 15,2002).
125 See James M. Buchanan, The Samaritan's Dilemma, in Edmund S. Phelps, ed, Altruism,
Morality, and Economic Theory 71, 75-78 (Russell Sage 1975) (describing the Samaritan's di-
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credibly threaten not to donate more aid unless the donee gives at
least some of it to the poor, but in equilibrium the donor will have to,
in essence, "bribe" the donee government in order to ensure that some
of the aid reaches the poor. The cost of bribery reduces the altruistic
return to a donation, thus reducing the equilibrium level of donation
itself.
3. Imperfect governments; imperfect enforcement.
As noted above, an international legal system governing aid
could be useful if there is a collective action problem. If all donor na-
tions benefit when the level of poverty in a donee nation is reduced,
then such a collective action problem exists. A legal system that re-
quired states to donate a certain amount of aid could make them bet-
ter-off, against a baseline where they make unilateral donations based
on the altruism of their citizens.
No such system exists, and the most likely reasons are: (1) The
wealthy states can accomplish the same goals through informal nego-
tiation; given the small number of donor states, it is not clear that le-
galization would be necessary. (2) The wealthy states (or their citizens)
may have different views about where aid should go and what type of
aid should be supplied. Thus, there may not be sufficient agreement
for a legal regime. (3) There is the free rider problem; wealthy states
may be unwilling to sanction other wealthy states that fail to donate -
other than by failing to donate themselves-in which case no aid is
provided.
To solve this problem, Thomas Pogge proposes what he calls a
Global Resources Dividend (GRD).' A GRD is a tax on the produc-
tion or use of natural resources, whose proceeds are to be disbursed to
the poorest states. As an example, Pogge suggests a $2 per barrel tax
on crude oil extraction; such a tax would raise several hundred billion
dollars annually, enough to bring more than two billion people above
the World Bank's poverty line. Transparent rules would require that
more money go to countries that make the most progress in eradicat-
ing poverty. As for enforcement, an agency would identify states that
violate their obligations, and then all other states would be required to
impose tariffs on imports from and perhaps exports to that country. '
Pogge argues that his scheme is realistic because the GRD is more
morally compelling than conventional forms of aid, it avoids a collec-
lemma-that is, how the expectation of charity can lead parties to act in such a way as to main-
tain poverty).
126 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights at 197-215 (cited in note 8).
127 See id at 205-08.
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tive action problem by forcing states to commit themselves to making
contributions, and it has prudential benefits, as countries beset by
poverty and misery pose security threats to wealthy nations.'
Pogge's attention to institutional dimensions is welcome but his
arguments are not persuasive. As he acknowledges, existing foreign
aid reflects mostly strategic interests and its altruistic component is
very small.'29 He suggests that states would be more altruistic if asked
to join a program like his, which, he says, is consistent with a diverse
array of ethical theories, but unilateral aid is also consistent with these
ethical theories. In fact, Pogge's scheme is worse, from an ethical
standpoint, than unilateral donation because it would almost certainly
cause more harm than good. The tax would fall on the billions of peo-
ple who make more than the World Bank's $2 per day threshold but
are still extremely poor, who would have to pay more for the products
and services they consume: bus fares, housing, food, clothing-the
prices of all these products will rise because oil and other natural re-
sources are factors in their production. As for the people below the $2
per day threshold, we know from experience that many of them will
not receive any benefits, even while they will have to pay higher
prices.' ,  Pogge acknowledges that some governments will misuse aid;
these governments will be deprived of the aid.'3' Yet their citizens will
still have to pay higher prices for any imported goods, or domestic
goods that use imported inputs, while receiving none of the benefits.
Further, Pogge does not explain how states can solve their collective
action problem simply by agreeing to the GRD program. States have
strong incentives to violate their obligations, and other states would
have strong incentives not to punish them by engaging in trade protec-
tionism, which in any event would throw the entire global trading sys-
tem into disarray. Indeed, this kind of problem-which is ubiquitous in
the international arena and has defeated many schemes more modest
than Pogge's-would also undermine his agency, which is vulnerable
to manipulation for political reasons. Finally, the prudential benefits
that Pogge attributes to his system-greater security for the rich na-
tions if impoverished nations are made better-off-are no different
from those claimed for the current unilateral system.
128 See id at 211-13.
129 See id at 207.
130 See, for example, Rieff, A Bed for the Night at 189-93 (cited in note 92) (discussing the
failures of humanitarian efforts in Rwanda); LaFraniere, Africa Tackles Graft (cited in note 123).
131 See Pogge. World Povertv and Human Rights at 206-07 (cited in note 8). The fact is that
almost all governments misuse aid-much of it ends up in the pockets of corrupt officials. So
Pogge's system would most likely enrich government officials at the expense of poor people who
must pay higher prices or, if it were enforced rigorously, benefit a few poor people in a few states
at the expense of poor people who live elsewhere.
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The existing aid scheme is, by any measure, ungenerous, but it is
an artifact of the division of the world into self-governing states. If a
single world state existed, a more generous income transfer scheme
would exist-a scheme similar to the kind that we see in nation-states
today-because the poor would influence government policy. But one
would also have to recognize that massive agency costs and the het-
erogeneity of preferences would make the world government's provi-
sion of public goods extremely poor, so that the welfare gains from
superior redistribution might be wiped out. More useful than imagin-
ing such a system or advocating schemes like Pogge's is the more mun-
dane process of understanding how the minimal amount of aid that
existing states are willing to disburse is best used to address short-
term crises and to promote lasting development."'
4. Evidence: law and history.
As noted above,133 the evidence suggests that cross-border altru-
ism exists but is minimal. States have not agreed to international obli-
gations to provide aid; the wealthy states do provide some aid but only
on a voluntary basis. Some of it is direct; some of it is administered
through institutions such as the World Bank. The latter and other in-
stitutions ensure that aid is coordinated and is not redundant, but oth-
erwise states remain free to donate as much or as little aid as they
wish.
E. Summary
If governments are perfect agents for their citizens, and enforce-
ment is perfect, then globally welfare-maximizing international law
would mainly prevent governments from preying on each other and
encourage them to cooperate with each other. The principle of sover-
eignty accomplishes the first task, and we would observe multilateral
treaties that require states to cooperate in the production of global
collective goods such as climate control. However, these treaties
would not produce optimal collective goods because of asymmetry
and distributional problems; indeed, they likely would produce out-
comes not much better than what we observe today. In addition, inter-
national law would not force states to transfer wealth to each other-
neither directly, in the form of aid, nor indirectly, in the form of acqui-
escence in international treaties that distribute surpluses on the basis
of need rather than bargaining power. Supranational institutions
132 See generally, for example, Gerald M. Meier and James E. Rauch, eds, Leading Issues in
Economic Development (Oxford 8th ed 2004).
133 See Part IV.B.4.
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would likewise respect existing wealth and power distributions rather
than change them.
If governments are imperfect agents for their citizens, and en-
forcement is perfect, then globally welfare-maximizing international
law would be weaker. The problem is that dictatorships-and even
democracies- will not necessarily agree to welfare-maximizing inter-
national law because such law may help people within their states who
do not have political power. A new tradeoff also complicates matters:
should democratic states cooperate with dictatorships in order to gen-
erate mutually beneficial surpluses (such as trade, climate control, and
so forth), or refuse to cooperate with dictatorships in order to under-
mine and discourage them? To the extent that the latter strategy is
globally welfare-maximizing, then international law will have nar-
rower scope.
If, in addition, enforcement is imperfect, then the scope of institu-
tionally constrained welfare-maximizing international law shrinks
even further. To the extent that states free ride on legal structures de-
signed to generate public goods, these legal structures will not receive
state consent in the first place (or will simply be ignored). The weak-
ness of collective action may favor the traditional, more robust con-
ception of sovereignty, but the extent to which it does so depends on
empirical parameters about which there is little information.
All of my assumptions are empirical, and readers may disagree
about them, but even if we vary them considerably, the overall conclu-
sions would remain similar. Suppose, for example, that preferences are
not as heterogeneous as they appear, or that, as globalization pro-
ceeds, the current heterogeneity of preferences declines. The predicted
outcome would be a reduction in the number of states but not any
general change in the state system. With fewer states, international
cooperation would be easier than it is today, but the history of inter-
state cooperation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries-when the number of states was less than a third of the number
today" -provides reason to think that the system overall would be
similar.
Or, suppose that agency costs are not as high as they appear, or
that-as technology like the Internet improves-agency costs de-
crease further. One might predict that governments become more
democratic, or that authoritarian governments become more respon-
sive to the interests of citizens. As a result, international treaties, like
other aspects of government policy, would improve-at least to the
extent that states maintain cooperative, rather than competitive, ap-
134 Alesina and Spolaore, The Size of Nations at 193 (cited in note 15).
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proaches to foreign relations. But states would continue to be jealous
of their sovereignty, indeed would become less likely to merge, and
more likely to break apart, with the result that the collective action
problem would worsen. International law thus might either improve
or weaken-it is impossible to tell, but there is no reason for opti-
mism.
Finally, suppose that the collective action problem is not as severe
as it appears, or that-as monitoring technologies improve or better
international structures are built-the collective action problem di-
minishes over time. States would cooperate more; multilateral treaties
would have thicker obligations and enjoy more parties. But states
would remain separate; indeed, the incentive for states to merge
would decline, and states might even break apart as smaller units real-
ize that they can take advantage of international cooperation. If this is
so, the collective action problem would be aggravated.
V. SOME OTHER QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Why States, Rather than Individuals or Supranational Entities,
Make International Law
If individuals made international law -for example, by voting for
delegates, who then passed laws by majority rule in an assembly-then
there would be no international law; there would be a world govern-
ment, and all law would be domestic. The reason that we do not have
such a system is that preferences are heterogeneous. People group
into states, and the state system is relatively stable, showing no move-
ment toward a world government system.
From time to time, people suggest that supranational entities should
make international law. For example, the European Union makes law,
albeit in a highly limited fashion, for its members. If the suggestion
means that a supranational entity such as the UN should make inter-
national law, and that entity operates through majority rule of dele-
gates chosen on the basis of proportional representation of people,
then the suggestion amounts to the argument that there should be a
world government. If the suggestion means that various regional su-
pranational entities-the European Union, an American Union, and
so forth-should make international law, then it is just an argument
that the current state system should be replaced with a state system
with fewer states. The reason we do not have such a system is that,
[73:487
International Law: A Welfarist Approach
outside Europe (and increasingly, it appears within Europe as well'35 )
preferences are so heterogeneous that smaller states rather than lar-
ger states appear to be the trend.
The nation-state appears to be the entity that most effectively trades
off scale economies and preference heterogeneities. To obtain suprana-
tional collective goods, then, states must cooperate with each other. They
do so chiefly by creating international law. Supranational bodies at the
regional level apparently are possible - at least in Europe - but they can-
not produce global collective goods, and in any event they remain rare.
B. Why Individuals Do Not Have (Many) Obligations under
International Law
States are responsible for most international law violations; indi-
viduals are not. For example, if a state denies overflight rights to an-
other state in violation of a treaty, the state is legally responsible; the
persons who adopted the policy, gave the orders, or fulfilled the orders
are not. The state that violated the treaty may be legally required to
pay reparations or take some other action.'6
To understand this rule, imagine that two states agree to reduce
cross-border pollution. Each state has an interest in seeing that the
rule is enforced, but neither state has an interest in how the other
state enforces the rule. One state might find that criminal penalties are
the best way to prevent its own factory owners from polluting across
the border, while the other state might instead use zoning laws and
prohibit the construction of factories within a certain distance from
the border. In other words, the creation of the public good is consis-
tent with a diverse range of internal legal systems, and if international
law were to make individuals liable, it would interfere with whatever
internal system might be best for a particular state.
One might fear that if states, not individuals, are liable, then in-
ternational law cannot have teeth. What if states enter treaties but
then make no effort to force their citizens to comply with them? To
answer this question, one must know why the state does not comply
with the treaty. If the answer is that circumstances have changed, and
the state no longer has an interest in complying with the treaty, then it
will not want individuals to be liable. The lack of individual liability
ensures that the decision to comply with or violate the treaty remains
135 See Richard Bernstein, 2 'No' Votes in Europe: The Anger Spreads, NY Times Al (June
2,2005) (indicating that a lack of approval by voters in France and the Netherlands has put plans
for a European Union constitution on hold).
136 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 207 (gov-
erning the attribution of conduct to states).
2006]
The University of Chicago Law Review
at the level of government. This is surely the reason why individual
liability is not common.
Another reason for refraining from individual liability is the
problem of bias. If the individual responsible for an international law
violation is prosecuted by the victim state, then the state has no incen-
tive to respect the individual's rights-he or she is not a citizen. If the
individual is prosecuted by his or her own state, then the state has no
incentive to ensure that the individual is properly prosecuted and pun-
ished-the victim is not a citizen. In theory, the other state can object
if the trial is biased, but in practice it is very difficult to tell whether a
trial is biased or not. This is why diplomats who are accused of com-
mitting crimes are expelled rather than tried.
But individual liability does exist for a limited class of interna-
tional law violations -chiefly, international crimes."7 Soldiers who
commit war crimes can be held individually liable, either by their own
government or by foreign governments. An early example of an inter-
national crime was that of piracy. A government that caught a pirate
could try and execute him even if the pirate had not committed any
crime on that government's territory or in its territorial seas-even if
the pirate had not committed a crime against that government's na-
tionals. The reason was probably that the pirate's own government
had no control over him, so governments victimized by piracy could
not lodge a protest with the pirate's government and expect any re-
course. In the absence of effective recourse against the state, individ-
ual liability was a second-best solution -although bringing with it cer-
tain risks, such as politically biased prosecutions.
It is questionable whether this logic applies to modern war crimes.
Soldiers, unlike pirates, are controlled by governments. Perhaps this
explains why, although international criminal liability exists as a cate-
gory of international law, actual prosecutions remain extremely rare.
C. Why States (Usually) Have the Same Legal Obligations
Regardless of Political System, Size, Power, or Wealth
Wouldn't welfare-maximizing international law impose fewer ob-
ligations on large states than on small states because large states are
responsible for the well-being of a large number of people? Alterna-
tively, or in addition, wouldn't such law impose greater obligations on
powerful and wealthy states so that they will use their power and
137 See, for example, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (cited in note 96).
138 See Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Criminal Law 6-7 (unpublished manu-
script 2005) (on file with author).
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wealth to help the poor living in other states? Instead, international
law imposes the same obligations on all states.
The last statement needs to be qualified in a few ways. The gen-
eral rules of international law impose the same obligations on all
states; states are allowed to adjust their obligations by treaty however
they want to. In particular, customary international law treats all states
the same. Many major international legal institutions, such as the
United Nations and the International Court of Justice, are based on
the principle of sovereign equality, which means that all states are
treated equally.'9 However, the United Nations cannot act in major
ways without the consent of the most powerful states; the ICJ is also
biased in their favor"O and is in any event mostly ineffectual.
The rough answer to the questions above is that if states effi-
ciently produce public goods for their citizens, then there is no reason
for them to be required to help other states produce public goods for
their citizens, or to be allowed to interfere with those states. Large
states produce public goods for more people, but that doesn't mean
they should have the power to interfere with the public good produc-
tion of small states. If there are imbalances attributable to wealth dif-
ferences, these imbalances can be handled through aid.
But what if governments are imperfect? As noted above, dictator-
ships and democracies have roughly the same incentives to choose poli-
cies that create public goods, and so they should agree to similar kinds
of international obligations-the exception being for international obli-
gations that prohibit dictatorship and its means. In theory, democracies
could enhance global welfare by isolating and attacking dictatorships,
and replacing the government with a democratic government. In prac-
tice, this has proven far too difficult and risky because dictatorships
are hard to defeat, and a defeated dictatorship is often replaced by
another dictatorship or civil war. Thus, democratic states gain by co-
operating with dictatorships, and this benefits their own citizens; there
is little reason to think that the citizens of dictatorships would be bet-
ter-off if democracies refused to cooperate with dictatorships.
D. Why International Law Is Predominantly Legislative and
Has Weak Judicial and Executive Institutions
International law consists of quite an elaborate set of laws, but
has weak judicial and executive institutions. Laws govern countless
aspects of international behavior: the use of force, the practice of war,
trade, communications, transport, the environment, and on and on.
139 But there are important exceptions, like the International Monetary Fund.
140 See Posner and Figueiredo, 34 J Legal Stud at 624-25 (cited in note 114).
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Adjudicative institutions consist mainly of informal ad hoc arbi-
tration. The ICJ has generally been ignored, as have a variety of other
lesser courts."' It is too early to tell whether the ICJ will succeed or
fail, but without the support of the United States and many of the
other major military powers, success seems likely to be limited. The
only bright spot is the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, but it is
still in its infancy. ' 2
As for executive institutions, there is only one: the UN Security
Council, which has the power to force states to comply with interna-
tional law and the exigencies of collective security. But five diverse
states hold a veto, and the veto power has ensured that the UN Secu-
rity Council remains toothless; indeed, it has never used its strongest
power, the power to order states to use military force."3
Thus, international legal institutions seem to be exceptionally thin
and unbalanced-as though, to use a domestic analogy, the U.S. Con-
gress made laws only by unanimous rule, U.S. courts could hear cases
but not enforce their judgments or even compel litigants to appear
before them, and no executive existed and instead people relied on
self-help to enforce their rights. Such a system would seem to be a
recipe for anarchy in the domestic realm; how could it exist interna-
tionally?
The answer to this puzzle is straightforward. Prescriptive rules
need the consent of states, states know what they are agreeing to, and
they agree to rules only when they serve their interest. International
law is usually thin-that is, it requires states to do little beyond what
they would ordinarily do-because diverse states can agree to rela-
tively little (except in bilateral settings). Still, international rules exist
and govem a broad range of activities because states want to solve the
problem of cross-border externalities. Adjudication and execution,
however, are backward looking, zero-sum phenomena. One state must
lose an adjudication, and a state must also be the subject of execution.
These states are not usually willing to consent to this infringement on
their power and sovereignty. Thus, when executive and adjudicative
institutions are proposed, states rarely consent to them unless they
have a veto right or some other means of escaping adverse actions or
judgments. But adjudication and execution usually can't be effective
unless the parties involved delegate substantial discretion to an inde-
pendent body that has a small number of members who can act
quickly and efficiently. States are not willing to risk delegation for the
141 See Part IV.C.3.
142 See Posner and Yoo, 93 Cal L Rev at 44-50 (cited in note 115).
143 See Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power at 90-91 (cited in note 52).
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same reason that they do not merge into larger states: they fear that
the people who form the body will not be sufficiently responsive to
heterogeneous preferences."
VI. CONCLUSION
The reason that a world government does not exist is that the
global population is exceptionally diverse. If a world government were
to spring into existence, it would quickly find itself unable to satisfy all
its citizens, who would improve their position by seceding and estab-
lishing independent states. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that states
would delegate substantial power to international institutions that
would implement the same policies that a hypothetical world govern-
ment would. Yet we know that some international institutions are pos-
sible, so the question is: what are the limits of international legal or-
ganization?
The strategy of this Article has been to make several simple as-
sumptions-the heterogeneity of preferences, the imperfection of
governments, and the difficulty of collective action-and then ask
what kind of international legal reform consistent with these assump-
tions is likely to advance global welfare. The conclusion is that interna-
tional law and organization are likely to remain thin and weak in the
foreseeable future, but that within these constraints improvement is
possible. Those who advocate legal reform should focus on modest
revisions that are consistent both with global welfarism and institu-
tional constraints.
A recurrent example of this argument has been humanitarian in-
tervention. A new rule that permits humanitarian intervention might
be justified, but if-as Singer implies-humanitarian intervention can
be legitimate only under the auspices of a democratic United Na-
tions,'5 then we must stay with the status quo, which means tolerating
humanitarian crises, even genocide, on the ground that unilateral in-
144 A related question is why international legal change occurs so frequently through simple
law violation-states stop following a law and over time other states acquiesce-rather than
agreement. The most probable answer is that customary international law is so hard to change: it
requires consensus, and consensus is always hard to achieve. Robert Goodin makes the interest-
ing proposal that customary international law may be changed only if the state in question
breaks it openly, pays reparations if appropriate, and agrees that the proposed rules will apply to
itself as well as to others. See Robert E. Goodin, Toward an International Rule of Law: Distin-
guishing International Law-Breakers from Would-Be Law-Makers, 9 J Ethics 225, 233-38 (2005).
The question, from the perspective of this Article, is whether such a rule is sustainable. Although
the first condition already is part of international law, it seems doubtful that other states will
collectively sanction a state that advances a genuine improvement of the law but without doing
so openly and without paying reparations.
145 See Singer, One World at 144-48 (cited in note 7).
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tervention would make long-term aggression more likely. Another
example is Kyoto. An environmental treaty that places equal burdens
on states is more likely to obtain universal consent than one that dis-
criminates in favor of the poor. Even such a treaty, however, is vulner-
able to the collective action problem. Global climate change-like
war-might be a problem that cannot be fully solved. A third example
is international criminal justice. The problem with the International
Criminal Court is that it requires states to delegate substantial power
to persons - the prosecutors, the judges - that they cannot control. Ad
hoc tribunals set up in response to specific events -such as the Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda tribunals--have a greater chance of success be-
cause the states that establish the tribunals can immunize their own
nationals. '4
The most visible manifestation of the general problem is global
distributional justice. One can imagine, as a point of comparison, a
democratic world government that is responsive to the interests of
billions of impoverished voters. Such a government would surely re-
distribute much more wealth to the poor than we observe today. But
no world government exists or is foreseeable. In its absence, we must
make do with the state system. Because all or virtually all states must
consent to international law and institutions, wealthy states will never
have a legal obligation to contribute significant resources to poor
states. Authors try to evade this conclusion by proposing institutional
reforms. But these reforms either approximate a world government
(usually a federalist version) or assume the continuing existence of the
state system. The first is by hypothesis unavailable; the second does
not solve the problem because the wealthy countries will veto any
significant distributive measures. '
People's views about these conclusions will depend to a large ex-
tent on intuitions about human psychology and other empirical reali-
ties, and diverse intuitions are reasonable. The minimal conclusion to
be drawn is that institutions matter, and that philosophers and legal
scholars who propose institutional reform so that global justice may
146 Another example is global antitrust law. See Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Anti-
trust, and the Limits of International Cooperation, 38 Cornell Intl L J 173,217 (2005) (concluding
that an ambitious international antitrust system is likely to fail because of institutional con-
straints).
147 But see Young, Inclusion and Democracy at 265-75 (cited in note 31) (advocating
greater authority for the United Nations in the short-term, and global democracy in the long-
term). Young's short-term solution works within the UN system, but she does not explain why
the powerful countries with the veto will acquiesce in redistribution or yield power over interna-
tional economic institutions. (She says they need to be "shamed" into it.) Her long-term solution
is "global democracy," involving various democratic international organizations, but she does not
explain how such a system would be possible.
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be achieved have the burden of explaining their empirical assump-
tions. The problem can be encapsulated as the following question: if a
world government is not possible in the foreseeable future, as most
scholars assume, then why should radical reform of the United Na-
tions or other elements of the current international system be possi-
ble? To answer this question, one needs a theory that explains what
kind of institutional and legal reforms are compatible with the empiri-
cal conditions that underlie the modern state system. I have identified
three such conditions: the heterogeneity of preferences, agency costs,
and collective action problems. The next step is for reformers to ex-
plain whether they accept these conditions but disagree about their
importance, or reject them and have another theory of international
institutions that supports their reform proposals.
The more ambitious conclusion is that international law is, and
must be, weak, and, specifically, cannot fully exploit opportunities for
creating global collective goods. The argument is that if the world
population could create institutions that created global collective
goods, then it would also be able to create a world government. If, as
history seems to show, it cannot, then there is no reason to think that
international law can do indirectly what a world government would do
directly were it possible. A troubling implication of this argument is that
as international law advances, becomes stronger, and supplies more
public goods, populations within states have a greater incentive to se-
cede, leading to greater fragmentation of the world population, and
thus greater difficulty in international cooperation. The rapid increase
in the number of states during the past half century, a time of great ex-
pansion in international law, especially international trade law, is prima
facie evidence for this claim. Although the cost of political fragmenta-
tion may be less than the gains from international law, this phenome-
non may put a limit on what international law can accomplish.
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